

CONGRESSIONAL PRO AND CON DIGEST

October, 1933

Should We Recognize Soviet Russia?

A Review of Our Past Relations

A. With Tserist Russia

B. With Soviet Russia

Origin and Aim of the "Comintern"

Our Trade Relations with Russia Today

The Meaning of Official Recognition

Full Pro and Con Discussion



WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST

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THE CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST

The Question This Month:

Should the United States Government Recognize Soviet Russia?

Foreword

SEVERAL incidents occurring since March 4, last, when the Roosevelt Administration was inaugurated, have revived speculation as to the possibility of the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.

The first of these was a report from London in July that, following the announcement by Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Economic Conference, that Russia was in the market for a billion dollars' worth of supplies, Mr. Litvinov and Mr. Raymond Moley, then Assistant Secretary of State, had discussed trade relations and the possibility of recognition, and that President Roosevelt had instructed the American delegation to deal with the Russian delegates to the Conference exactly as they dealt with the delegates from other countries.

The second was the announcement by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on July 3 that it had approved loans of approximately \$4,000,000 to American exporters, the money to be used to buy surplus cotton for resale to Russia.

The third was the announcement on September 20 that Henry Morgenthau, Jr., governor of the Farm Credit Administration, had been directed by the President to take charge of trade negotiations with Russia.

The most reliable information obtainable by the DIGEST from official sources as to the actual situation is this:

During the London Conference the American delegates talked frequently with the Russian delegates, but without any definite aim in view.

The money loaned by the R. F. C. for the purchase of surplus cotton was loaned and is being loaned to American exporters who will be held responsible for its repayment.

The designation of Mr. Morgenthau to handle trade matters was due to the fact that, as head of the Farm Credit Administration he is the man to handle the sale of surplus cotton, and is in the best position to be a sort of clearing house for those exporters who come to Washington with plans for any sort of trading with Russia.

It has been made plain at the White House that any negotiations looking to recognition of Russia or any negotiations regarding the settlement of foreign debts—and the debt question looms large in any consideration of diplomatic discussions with Russia—will be handled by the Department of State.

So far as President Roosevelt, himself, is concerned, he has at no time indicated his own plans regarding recognition. Neither during the campaign for the Presidency nor since he became President has he made a statement on this point.

There is this to be considered, however. Whereas, under the Wilson, Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations inquiries as to the possibility of recognition were always met in official circles with the reply that there was no change in the situation, inquiries today are met with the reply that there are no recent developments.

In other words, there is a distinct impression in Washington that the Roosevelt Administration not only does not entertain the adamant opposition to dealing with the Soviet Government that characterized the four preceding Administrations, but, furthermore, that it is distinctly open minded on the question.

In any event, enough has been said to make it certain that the Russian question will be the topic of lively discussion during the next few months.

In this number of the DIGEST will be found articles on the historical background of American-Russian relations; present trade relations; the Third International; what recognition is and how it is established and a full Pro and Con discussion of whether America should recognize Russia.

A Review of U. S. Relations with Tsarist Russia

1780 - 1917

1780=

The Continental Congress appointed Francis Dana, of Massachusetts, Minister to Russia with instructions "to engage her Imperial Majesty (Catherine the Great) to favor and support the sovereignty of the United States" and to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. Mr. Dana, arriving in St. Petersburg, was refused a reception by Catherine. After a futile wait of two years, he returned to America. French intrigue and the desire of Catherine to retain English friendship were considered the reasons for her refusal to recognize the new American government.

1809=

Although there were occasional diplomatic contacts, it was not until thirty-three years after Dana's visit to St. Petersburg that official diplomatic relations were entered into by the United States and Russia. In June, 1809, Andre Daschkoff, who had been Russian Consul General at Philadelphia, was received by President Madison at Washington as Russia's diplomatic representative. President Madison appointed John Quincy Adams as America's diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg. Adams was well received and immediately began negotiations over the boundary of the Russian possessions on the northwest coast of North America as well as over the proposed treaty.

1812=

In June the United States declared war on England. As Napoleon had declared war on Russia, the Anglo-American conflict was a source of apprehension to the Russian government. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked Adams whether the United States would allow an offer of Russian mediation. Adams accepted the offer on behalf of Secretary of State Monroe.

1813=

President Madison named Albert Gallatin, John Quincy Adams and J. A. Bayard as envoys to conclude a peace treaty with England and at the same time to negotiate for a commercial treaty with Russia. England rejected the offer of Russian mediation.

1814=

The fall of Napoleon caused Russia's interest in Anglo-American peace to wane and the War of 1812 was brought to a close by direct negotiations terminating in the Treaty of Ghent.

1817=

William Pinkney, the new American Minister, was warmly received at the Russian capital. The diplomatic

negotiations of this period centered around Russian encroachments on the Pacific coast.

1820=

The Tsar arbitrated a dispute between Great Britain and the United States over the meaning of Article I of the Treaty of Ghent. The award was favorable to the United States.

1821=

The Russian representative approached the American minister, Middleton, with a renewed proposal for a commercial treaty, but it was again dropped.

Russian-American relations in the North Pacific approached a crisis. The Tsar renewed the charter of the Russian-American Company and granted Russian subjects exclusive fishing and trading rights as far south as fifty-one degrees North Latitude. Foreign vessels were forbidden even to approach the coast. In response to the protest of the United States, Poletica claimed that early exploration had really given jurisdiction to Russia, as far south as forty-nine degrees and that the North Pacific Ocean was in reality a closed Russian sea due to the fact that Russia owned both shores north of fifty-one degrees and in spite of the fact that these shores were four thousand miles apart. The United States would not accede to either of these claims.

1823=

Monroe wrote his famous message incorporating the Monroe doctrine, in which he asserted that the American continents were no longer to be considered subject to European colonization.

1824=

On April 17th, Middleton concluded with Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, a "Convention as to the Pacific Ocean and northwest coast of North America." This was the first formal agreement which was actually concluded between the two nations. It provided for freedom of navigation, fishing and trading with the natives inhabiting the coast of the Pacific Ocean and fixed the line of 54°40' as the northern limit of American colonization.

1832=

The long anticipated treaty of commerce and navigation was at last signed on December 18. Under it commerce flourished and it seemed wholly satisfactory to both countries. The first article, alone, gave rise to controversy, but that was not until seventy years later.

1854=

On July 22, upon the occasion of the Crimean war,

there was signed a "Convention as to the Rights of Neutrals at Sea," the third formal agreement concluded between the two countries.

1859=

The United States offered Russia \$5,000,000 for the purchase of Alaska but the offer was rejected.

1862=

During the American Civil War, Russia aligned herself with the North and repeatedly expressed her friendship for the Union.

1863=

On September 11, two Russian squadrons came into United States ports in order to be on hand to assist the Union in case of European intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. The Admirals and their colleagues were wine and dined for several months and both nations were profuse in their expressions of friendship.

1866=

On the occasion of an attempted assassination of Alexander I, the United States returned the visit of 1863.

1867=

On March 29, the United States purchased Alaska for \$7,200,000.

1868=

An additional article to the treaty of 1832 was signed prohibiting the counterfeiting in each country of trade marks issued in the other. This agreement was added to in 1874.

1884=

A declaration was signed regulating the admeasurement of vessels for the purpose of levying navigation dues.

1887=

An extradition convention was signed. The United States began to protest against Russia's policy of refusing to readmit to Russia returning Jewish subjects who had become American citizens. The contention was that this was a violation of the treaty of 1832, but Russia persistently adhered to its position.

1892-93=

Russia seized American vessels engaged in sealing beyond the three mile limits in the Behring Sea, off of the coast of Russia.

1894=

After considerable contention had arisen over the hunting of fur seals along the Russian and Alaskan coasts, an agreement was finally reached defining limits of boundaries and of the number of seals to be taken.

1900=

A claims protocol was signed at St. Petersburg which provided for arbitration by Mr. Asser, member of the Council of State of the Netherlands, over American claims for damages arising out of the Russian seizures of American vessels in 1892 and 1893. The award granted over \$100,000 to various American claimants.

1903=

As a result of the Kishenev pogrom against Jews, the United States government asked the Russian Government whether financial aid and supplies from American Jews would be permitted to reach the suffering survivors of the massacre. Russia declined the offer.

1904=

An agreement was signed recognizing the legal existence of corporations and stock companies in each country.

American representatives in Russia undertook to protect Japan's interests in Russia at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The American government declared itself neutral. In February Secretary of State Hay invited Germany, Great Britain and France to join the United States in urging both belligerents to recognize Chinese neutrality. Japan assented but Russia excepted Manchuria, which was the scene of hostilities.

1905=

Russia notified the United States that she would have to consider Chinese neutrality "from the standpoint of her own interests." However, Japan was feeling the economic pressure of the war and Russia felt utterly defeated, so on August 10th, peace negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the United States acting as mediator between the two countries. As a result the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5. Both parties agreed to evacuate Manchuria and to recognize the "open door" in China.

1907=

Russia's refusal to readmit expatriated Jews aroused protests in America. Elihu Root, Secretary of State, seemed inclined to acquiesce in the Russian point of view but the flood of criticism with which this attitude was met, caused him to modify his position.

1908=

The American Jewish Committee petitioned President Roosevelt for the abrogation of the commercial treaty of 1832.

1911=

A number of resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives calling upon the President to denounce the Treaty of 1832 on the ground that Russia had violated it by discriminating against one category of American citizens.

President Taft, realizing that Congress was sure to pass one of the pending resolutions and that the language of the resolution passed would be offensive to Russia, took the initiative.

On December 17, the Secretary of State cabled to the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg the text of a note abrogating the treaty, the abrogation to take effect January 1, 1913. This note was presented to Foreign Minister Sazanov on December 17. On December 21, Congress finally passed a resolution for abrogation but since the President already had acted, the Congressional resolution was framed so as to be a ratification of the Executive act.

The treaty was never revived.

A Review of U. S. Relations with Soviet Russia

1917-1928

1917=

The breakdown of the Russian railroads during the winter of 1916-17 resulted in shortage of food in Russian cities, leading to strikes, and food riots in expression of the popular resentment against the Tsarist Government which had long been smoldering.

ON MARCH 11, the Government adjourned the Duma or Parliament, and ordered striking workmen in Petrograd back to work. The workers were defiant and the troops refused to comply with orders to suppress the workers. Socialist leaders organized a local Soviet or Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies to confer with a committee of the Duma, and the "March Revolution" began.

ON MARCH 15 Tsar Nicholas II announced the abdication of his throne and a "Provisional Government" was created pending the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. The Cabinet of the Provisional Government was headed by Prince Lvoff. All its other members, but one, were members of the middle class. The exception was Alexander Kerensky, Minister of Justice, representing the Moderate Socialists.

ON MARCH 18, David Francis, American Ambassador at Petrograd, cabled the State Department at Washington asking authority to recognize the new Provisional Government. In his cablegram he wrote, "This revolution is the practical realization of that principle of government which we have championed and advocated. I mean government by consent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral effect especially if given first." Secretary of State Lansing promptly authorized Ambassador Francis to recognize the new Russian Government on behalf of the United States and on March 22, Ambassador Francis called on Foreign Minister Miliukoff at 11 A. M. to announce recognition by the United States. At 4:30 P. M. the American Ambassador formally appeared before Prince Lvoff and the Council of Ministers and accorded the recognition of the United States.

At 3 o'clock on the same day Great Britain and France sent notes expressing their intention of recognizing the new government, but American recognition was the first to be formally extended. The fact that America had decided to enter the World War and that Russia was one of the Allies had a bearing on the promptness of recognition.

Friction rapidly developed between the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet over a foreign policy. The Petrograd Soviet, representing the rank and file of the workers and soldiers, demanded an early and general peace.

ON MAY 15, the Petrograd Soviet issued an appeal "to the Socialists of All Countries" stating that the Russian revolution was not only a revolt against Tsardom but also against the horrors of the World War, and "the first stage of a world revolution" and calling for an international

meeting "of all the Socialist parties and factions in every country."

"A unanimous decision by the Proletarian International," the statement declared, "will be the first victory of the toilers over the Internationale of the Imperialists. Proletarians of the world, unite!"

The Soviet demand for "a peace without indemnities or annexations" increased anxiety among the Allies as to Russia's loyalty. But they declined to accept the "peace without indemnity" plea.

ON MAY 14, President Wilson appointed a special mission to Russia, headed by Elihu Root, former Republican Senator from New York and former U. S. Secretary of State. The other members of the mission were Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, U. S. A.; Rear Admiral James H. Glennon, U. S. N.; Charles R. Crane, Cyrus H. McCormick and Samuel R. Bertron, industrialists; John R. Mott, Y. M. C. A. worker; Charles Edward Russell, Socialist author, and James Duncan, first vice-president of the American Federation of Labor. On June 13 the American Mission reached Petrograd and spent a month conferring with officials of the Provisional Government. The membership of the mission aroused suspicion among the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. The Americans talked democracy whereas the Petrograd Soviet was for Socialism.

On the same day the Root Mission arrived in Petrograd, a Russian Mission arrived in America. It included Professor Boris Bakmeteff, who had been named by the Provisional Government to succeed George Bakmeteff, the last Tsarist Ambassador. The two Bakmeteffs were not related.

ON MAY 26, President Wilson addressed a note to the Provisional Government in which he stated that America "seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind" from the war; and that "she is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggression of autocratic force. . . ." This and other similar appeals had no effect in Russia.

ON JUNE 2, the Petrograd Soviet issued a formal call for an International Soviet Conference to meet at Stockholm on July 8, to unite in an effort to stop the war. Opposition on the part of the Allied Governments caused the Stockholm meeting to be postponed. Victor Berger, Morris Hilquit and Algernon Lee were chosen by the American Socialist party as its delegates, but the State Department refused to give them passports.

ON JULY 17, the Provisional Government called out Cossacks to suppress a demonstration of the soldiers and sailors. Sailors from Kronstadt resisted the Cossacks and several hundred were killed.

Nikolai Lenin had returned to Russia through Germany with the aid of the German Government and with

Leon Trotsky, was inciting a revolution against the Provisional Government. After the riots Lenin went into hiding. Trotsky was arrested but was soon released.

The American Ambassador, David Francis, and the British Ambassador, George Buchanan, both warned the Provisional Government against allowing Lenin and Trotsky to continue inciting the soldiers to desert and revolt.

The Provisional Government continued to grow weaker and weaker, while the strength of the Bolsheviks increased.

ON NOVEMBER 7, the day which had been set for a meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Red Guards, who had been organized by the Bolsheviks, and who comprised practically all of the soldiers in Petrograd, began seizing all the public buildings.

Finding his soldiers had deserted, Kerensky borrowed an automobile belonging to the American Embassy and fled to the regular army front under protection of the American flag.

Simultaneously the Bolsheviks were gaining complete control over the Congress, which created a Council of People's Commissars, with Lenin as President, Trotsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Bolsheviks holding other posts, and adjourned. Within a month, after several bloody battles between Red troops and the troops under Kerensky, the latter were completely routed. Kerensky fled the country and the Bolshevik Government was firmly established. This is generally referred to as "the November Revolution."

ON NOVEMBER 10, Ambassador Bakhmeteff repudiated the Bolshevik government and assured the United States government that he would remain at his post as Russian representative and would continue "to uphold firmly the dignity of national and loyal Russia, and to maintain the responsibility of all engagements and commitments of the legal government of Russia which has been entrusted to me." The United States and Allied representatives in Russia showed no desire to recognize the Bolshevik government, as they did not believe it would last.

ON NOVEMBER 20, the American press announced that the Government would not allow any more supplies to be sent to Russia for any purpose, due to the fact that they would be seized by the Bolshevik leaders and given to Germany to help her win the war. Later it was officially denied that an embargo had been placed, but at the same time no more supplies were shipped where it was known that they would be apt to go astray.

ON NOVEMBER 21, Leon Trotsky addressed the first formal note from the Soviet Government to the Ambassadors of the United States and the Allied Powers informing them of the establishment of a new government of Russia and asking them to join in signing a general "armistice and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities." These notes received no response.

ON NOVEMBER 23, the Allied Military Attachés addressed General Dukhonin of the Russian army and threatened him with "serious consequences" if Russia should make a separate peace with Germany in violation of inter-Allied agreement of September 5, 1914. France informed him that they would not recognize any government that would do such a thing. Dukhonin had been removed from his post as commander and it enraged Trotsky that this note had been sent to the deposed officer without regard for Soviet authority.

ON NOVEMBER 27, Lieut. Col. Kerth of the American Military Mission at the front, also sent a note to Dukhonin

protesting against a separate armistice to be entered into by Russia. Trotsky once again protested stating that he did not demand recognition but that he could not "allow Allied diplomatic and military agents for any purpose to interfere in the internal life" of his country.

ON DECEMBER 1, Brig. General William V. Judson, military attaché of the American Embassy at Petrograd who sent a friendly note to the Soviet Government, made a visit to Trotsky for the purpose of entering into informal relations. Judson was soon recalled to Washington, indicating disapproval of his action.

A short time after the Revolution in November, Col. Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia, began to make informal contacts with the Soviet Government to discover whether he could continue to carry on his work as formerly. He requested aid from the Soviet Government in transporting some of his supplies and was given every possible assistance. He continued unofficial contacts with the Bolsheviks, which it was impossible for Ambassador Francis to make. At first the State Department disapproved of the practice but withdrew its objections when Francis joined Robins in his recommendation of the value of these contacts.

ON DECEMBER 6, Trotsky addressed the Allied ambassadors, informing them that the armistice negotiations which had been begun at Brest-Litovsk, would be suspended for one week in order that the other nations might participate. Trotsky received no reply. On December 15 the armistice was signed between Russia and the Central Powers.

1918=

ON JANUARY 8, President Wilson presented to Congress his famous peace program, including his "Fourteen Points." This came almost as a direct answer to Russia's plea for America to join them in their peace. About the middle of January Ambassador Francis made his first and last formal call on Lenin. The occasion was to demand the release of the Rumanian Minister, M. Dimandi, who had been arrested. The State Department hastened to state that this call did not signify recognition.

ON FEBRUARY 8, the Soviet Government decreed the repudiation of Russia's state debts. This had the effect of halting all prospects of recognition by either the United States or the Allied countries.

ON FEBRUARY 29, Trotsky again attempted to urge the Allies to join in making peace.

ON FEBRUARY 23, Germany issued a forty-eight hour ultimatum to Russia giving even more drastic terms which Russia, rather than continue fighting was forced to accept.

ON MARCH 3 the peace was signed, by which Russia relinquished claim to the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic Provinces and Finland.

ON MARCH 5, Trotsky proposed to Robins to defeat ratification of the peace in return for American and Allied aid to Russia against Germany. The Trotsky offer, however, contained the proviso that the internal and foreign policies of Russia should be continued on international-socialist principles and that the Soviet Government retain "its complete independence of all non-socialist governments." Lenin agreed to oppose ratification of peace at the forthcoming Congress of Soviets if the United States would return an encouraging reply.

ON MARCH 9, Ambassador Francis, in a cable to the State Department, reiterated his opinion that Lenin and Trotsky were German agents.

ON MARCH 11, President Wilson addressed a message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets expressing the sympathy of the American people for the Russian people. "Although the Government of the United States is unhappy, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render," President Wilson declared, "I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world."

ON MARCH 12, the Trotsky offer of March 5, which had been held up on account of Communications difficulties was despatched to Washington. In his note of transmission Ambassador Francis stated that if Washington considered any other reply necessary after President Wilson's message to the Soviet Congress, it could be delivered to Trotsky by Robins. Other than this no reply was sent to Trotsky, since President Wilson's message was considered an adequate expression of America's attitude.

ON MARCH 16, the All-Russian Soviet Congress voted to ratify the peace, the vote being 724 for ratification and 276 against ratification, with 204 not voting. Lenin made a speech advocating ratification.

In reply to the Wilson message, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its gratitude to the American people—"Above all to the laboring and exploited classes of the United States" for the sympathy expressed by President Wilson. In conclusion, the resolution stated:

"The Congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, above all to the laboring and exploited classes of the United States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian people by President Wilson through the Congress of Soviets in the days of severe trials.

"The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialist state of society, which alone is capable of securing just and lasting peace, as well as the culture and well-being of all laboring people."

This was considered by the Bolshevik leaders as a slap in the face to America.

ON JULY 1, Col. Raymond Robins reported to President Wilson on the Russian situation and recommended recognition.

ON AUGUST 30, Dora Kaplan, a Right Socialist-Revolutionist made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Lenin, as an act of counter revolution against the Bolsheviks. There followed the famous "Red Terror," involving wholesale arrests and mass executions by the Bolsheviks.

This "Red Terror," coupled with the rising apprehension on the part of the Allies that Lenin and Trotsky were working with the German army, brought about Allied intervention, and the sending of Allied troops including Americans into Russia to forestall what the Allies feared might become a definite Russian-German military combination. The Soviet Government always maintained that the real purpose of this military intervention was to destroy the Communist Government, and has set up against the Allied Government claims for damages as the result of it.

Dissatisfaction at the presence in Russia of American troops was expressed in Congress with the result that on June 30, 1919, the last of the American troops left Siberia.

1919=

ON JANUARY 2, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, living in New York, was appointed representative of the Soviet Foreign office in the United States.

ON MARCH 19, Martens sent his credentials to the Secretary of State, together with a general statement describing the aims of the Soviet Government. Martens also wrote to the Kerensky Ambassador, Boris Bakhmeteff, demanding that he surrender all Russian property in the United States. Both the State Department and Bakhmeteff ignored these communications.

Martens opened offices in New York and announced that he was prepared to open trade relations in behalf of the Soviet Government, guaranteed by a deposit of \$200,000,000 in gold. The Department of State, however, issued a statement warning American business interests that since the American Government had not recognized the Bolshevik Government, concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably could not be binding on future Russian governments. Martens succeeded in making a number of tentative contracts amounting to several million dollars, but the embargo on the transportation of funds from Russia and the refusal of export licenses to Russia prevented the execution of these contracts.

Although Martens was not a member of the Communist Party he had been a contributor to *Novy Mir*, the Russian Socialist paper published in New York, the publication to which Leon Trotsky had contributed while he was in New York in 1917, and was intimately associated with various New York Socialist organizations.

His speeches, delivered at this time, led to his being accused by various conservative and patriotic organizations of preaching Bolshevism.

ON JUNE 12, Martens' offices were raided by the New York State Constabulary and Martens and some of his staff were taken to the City Hall and questioned. The object of the raid was to search for evidence to prosecute Martens under the New York criminal anarchy statute. Foreign Minister Chicherin protested to the State Department demanding Martens' release as a Russian citizen and threatening reprisals against American citizens in Russia. The Department of State replied through the American Legation in Stockholm declaring that Martens was a German citizen and had not been arrested.

Anti-Bolshevism and anti-anarchist feeling became strong during this period and finally culminated in deportation of a number of aliens.

ON DECEMBER 22, the transport *Buford* sailed from New York for Finland with 249 Russian radicals on board, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, in consequence of which the *Buford* was dubbed "The Soviet Ark."

1920=

ON JANUARY 19, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary began an investigation of Martens' activities, with Martens appearing in answer to a summons. Evidence at the hearing showed that Martens was an international revolutionist by conviction but not that he had been guilty of acts of sedition.

A Federal warrant for his arrest was served by the Assistant Secretary of Labor upon the conclusion of the hearings and Martens was paroled in the custody of his attorney, former U. S. Senator Thomas Hardwick, of Georgia, pending an investigation of his case by the De-

partment of Labor. In the meantime Martens continued his work, buying American goods, including a supply of shoes from the War Department.

ON JULY 8, the United States followed the example of other Powers and removed the restrictions against trade with Russia, but did not open the mails to Russia and continued to withhold the granting of passports.

ON DECEMBER 18, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board raised the restriction on the shipment of coin, bullion and currency from Russia and the transfer of exchanges and credits.

ON DECEMBER 20, William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor, made his ruling on the evidence developed by his Department's investigation of Martens. It was to the effect that while Martens, himself, had not been guilty of advocating the forcible overthrow of the United States Government, the Soviet Government as part of the Third International and under the control of the Communist Party, did advocate such procedure and therefore, as an alien and its representative, Martens should be deported. Chicherin promptly ordered Martens to cancel all pending contracts and return to Russia. The Secretary of Labor permitted Martens to leave the United States without being arrested.

1921=

ON JANUARY 6, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs began hearings on a resolution by Representative Fred W. Dallinger, of Massachusetts, to inquire into trade relations with Russia.

ON JANUARY 8, Norman H. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, issued a general statement on the Government's position with respect to trade with Russia.

ON JANUARY 22, Martens, his family, and several of his staff sailed from New York on the *S. S. Stockholm*, "the Second Soviet Ark," on which were 75 deportees.

ON FEBRUARY 21, Martens cabled that he had arrived in Moscow and the Department of Labor cancelled the warrant for his arrest and deportation.

ON FEBRUARY 27, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on a resolution introduced by Senator France of Maryland for the same purpose. No action was taken on either resolution.

Official U. S. Statements Issued from 1920 to 1928

1920=

ON AUGUST 10, Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State under President Wilson, in a formal reply to an inquiry by the Italian Ambassador to the United States as to the position of the United States regarding the Russian-Polish situation, wrote:—

"It is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none disputes, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals. The responsible leaders of the regime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and

undertakings with foreign Powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into, they base upon the theory that no compact or agreement made with a non-Bolshevik government can have any moral force for them. They have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice. Indeed, upon numerous occasions the responsible spokesmen of this Power, and its official agencies, have declared that it is their understanding that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their governments and set up Bolshevik rule in their stead.

"It is within the knowledge of the Government of the United States that the Bolshevik Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction, with extensive international ramifications through the Third Internationale, and that this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevik Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevik revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviks have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no wise bind the agents of this body. There is no room for reasonable doubt that such agents would receive the support and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolsheviks might have in other countries. Inevitably, therefore, the diplomatic service of the Bolshevik Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries with whom it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened governments cannot subject themselves.

"In the view of this Government, there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense."

1923=

ON MARCH 21, Charles Evans Hughes, U. S. Secretary of State under President Harding, in addressing a delegation of the Women's Committee for Recognition of Russia, said:—

"The fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations. Of what avail is it to speak of assurances, if valid obligations and rights are repudiated and property is confiscated? This is not a question of the rich or of the poor. It is a question of principle.

"Our own government, after the first revolution, loaned about \$187,000,000 to Russia. I may say that we were the first to recognize the Kerensky Government; that government did not profess a policy of repudiation. Now what did the Soviet authorities do? In their Decree of January 21, 1918, they made this simple statement: 'Unconditionally, and without any exceptions, all foreign loans are annulled.'

"I have yet to hear of any change in this announcement of the Soviet authorities. Suggestions which have been reported have always been coupled with impossible qualifications. This strikes at the heart of some of the suggestions which have been made in the interest of the principles of religion, which we all have at heart—good faith is the very essence of brotherly kindness. There is no hope for the success of our gospel of brotherly kindness in a world of hatred and in a world which is not animated by the sincerity of good faith.

"Not only would it be a mistaken policy to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation, but it is also important to remember that there should be no encouragement to those efforts of the Soviet authorities to visit upon other peoples the disasters that have overwhelmed the Russian people. I wish that I could believe that such efforts had been abandoned. Last November (1932) Zinoviev said: 'The eternal in the Russian revolution is the fact that it is the beginning of the world revolution.' Lenin, before the last Congress of the Third Internationale, said that 'the revolutionists of all countries must learn the organization, the planning, the method and the substance of revolutionary work.' Then, I am convinced," he said, "the outlook of the world revolution will not be good but excellent." And Trotsky, addressing the Fifth Congress of the Russian Communist Youth at Moscow in October (1932) said this: 'That means, comrades, that revolution is coming in Europe as well as in America, sys-

tematically, step by step, stubbornly and with gnashing of teeth in both camps. It will be long protracted, cruel and sanguinary."

"Now I desire to see evidences of the abandonment of that policy. The world we desire is a world not threatened with the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there will be good faith and the recognition of obligations and a sound basis of international intercourse."

ON JULY 31, President Harding was scheduled to deliver an address at San Francisco on the foreign relations of the United States. The address was prepared but not delivered on account of Mr. Harding's fatal illness. It was later made public by the White House. That portion of the address referring to Russia follows:—

"The problem of Russian recognition is complicated by a fundamental difficulty, because of a government régime there whose very existence is predicated upon a policy of confiscation and repudiation. No one much questions the continuation of the present government, or wishes to direct the expression of Russian preference. There is an unflinching friendship in the United States for the people of Russia. The deplorable conditions in Russia have deeply touched the sympathies of the American people, and we have sought to give evidence of friendship rather than dictate the course of its government. I gladly recommended an appropriation of \$20,000,000 by Congress for the relief of her famine-stricken people, and, all told, America's friendly interest has been expressed in a \$66,000,000 relief expenditure. That this administration, supported by the strength and generosity of the American people, has saved the lives of ten millions of men, women, and children in Russia, at the very door of death from famine and pestilence, is the complete answer to every charge of our ill will toward the Russian people."

"It has been urged that we ought to grant political recognition to the present Russian régime because the destitution of the Russian people would thereby be put in the way of alleviation, and that this humane appeal is so urgent that all other considerations should be put aside. But the fact remains that the establishment of a basis of permanent improvement in Russia lies solely within the power of those who govern the destinies of that country, and political recognition prior to correcting fundamental error tends only to perpetuate the ills from which the Russian people are suffering. International good faith forbids any sort of sanction of the Bolshevik policy. The property of American citizens in Russia, honestly acquired under the laws then existing, has been taken without the color of compensation, without process of law, by the mere emission of countless decrees. Such a policy challenges the very groundwork of righteous intercourse among peoples, and rends the bases of good faith everywhere in the world."

"If the fundamentals of our boasted civilization are based on 20 centuries of maintained error, if the Russian conception of the social fabric is the true revelation, tardily conceived after 40 centuries of evolution and development, the truth will ultimately assert itself in the great experiment. I can see Russia only as the supreme tragedy, and a world warning, the dangers of which we must avoid if our heritage is to be preserved. If the revolutionary order is the way to higher attainment and greater human happiness, Russia will command our ultimate sanction. Meanwhile I prefer to safeguard our interests and hold unsullied the seemingly proven principles under which human rights and property rights are blended in the supreme inspiration to human endeavor. If there are no property rights there is little, if any, foundation for national rights, which we are ever being called upon to safeguard. The whole fabric of international commerce and righteous international relationship will fail if any great nation like ours shall abandon the underlying principles relating to sanctity of contract and the honor involved in respected rights."

ON DECEMBER 6, in his annual message to Congress, President Coolidge wrote:—

"Our diplomatic relations, lately so largely interrupted, are now being resumed, but Russia presents notable difficulties. We have every desire to see that great people, who are our traditional friends, restored to their position among the nations of the earth. We have relieved their pitiable destitution with an enormous charity. Our Government offers no objection to the carrying on of commerce by our citizens with the people of Russia. Our Government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another régime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity."

I do not propose to make merchandise of any American principles. These rights and principles must go wherever the sanctions of our Government go.

"But while the favor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But more are needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government, not by the Czar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meted for repentance; our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act."

ON DECEMBER 16, M. Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent the following note to President Coolidge:—

"It has been the constant endeavor of the Soviet Government to bring about a resumption of friendly relations with the United States of America based upon mutual trust. With this in view, it has repeatedly announced its readiness to enter into negotiations with the American Government and to remove all misunderstandings and differences between the two countries."

"After reading your message to Congress, the Soviet Government, sincerely anxious to establish at last firm friendship with the people and government of the United States, informs you of its complete readiness to discuss with your government all problems mentioned in your message, these negotiations being based on the principle of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs. The Soviet Government will continue wholeheartedly to adhere to this principle, expecting the same attitude from the American Government."

"As to the questions of claims mentioned in your message, the Soviet Government is fully prepared to negotiate with a view toward its satisfactory settlement on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized all around. On its part, the Soviet Government is ready to do all in its power, so far as the dignity and interests of its country permit, to bring about the desired end, of renewal of friendship with the United States of America."

ON DECEMBER 18, Charles Evans Hughes, U. S. Secretary of State, sent the following note to the American consul at Reval (now Tallinn), Estonia, to be delivered to the Soviet representative at that place as an indirect reply to the Tchicherin note:—

"There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned."

1928=

ON APRIL 14, Frank B. Kellogg, U. S. Secretary of State under President Hoover, made public a general declaration of the American policy concerning Soviet Russia, in which he stated:—

"Current developments demonstrate the continued persistence at Moscow of a dominating world revolutionary purpose and the practical manifestation of this purpose in such ways as render impossible the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet

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Origin and Aim of the Third International or "Comintern"

THE First International, or International Working Men's Association, was organized in London in 1864 under the leadership of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Its program, drawn up by Marx and adopted in 1866, provided for the discussion and furtherance of the rights of labor. Congresses of The First International met at Lausanne, 1867; Brussels, 1868, and Basle, 1869, after which the organization disintegrated and finally dissolved in 1874.

The Second International, or Socialist International, was organized in Amsterdam in 1889, as a loose federation of socialist and labor parties of varying degrees of radicalism or liberalism throughout Europe and America, representing an agreement on general policies but having no authority to impose specific lines of action on any group.

The Third International, or Communist International (Comintern), was organized in Moscow in 1919. On January 24 of that year Nicolai Lenin and Leon Trotsky issued a call to "left" Socialists of all countries to hold a Congress in Moscow on March 2. When, during the war Socialists in the warring countries were supporting their governments, Lenin had organized meetings of "defeatists" to urge sabotage, general strikes and uprisings to end war and these ideas he carried into the Moscow Congress which established The Third International. Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev were on a committee appointed by the Congress to draft a formal announcement. This announcement was made on March 10, 1919, in the form of a "Communist Manifesto" setting forth the objectives of the Third International.

The permanent organization of the Third International, its characteristics and connection with Communist government of Soviet Russia are thus described by Peter M. Mavelsky-Malevitch in his work, "Russia, U. S. S. R.; a Complete Handbook":

"Several characteristic extracts from the official text of the Statutes of the Communist International are herewith given verbatim:

"Par. 1. The Communist International, the international association of the worker, is the organization which unites all the Communist Parties of the world into one united Communist organization.

"Par. 2. The political organizations which adhere to the Communist International bear the name of "The Communist party of—(name of country)." In each country there can be only one Communist party, constituting a section of the Communist International.

"Par. 3. A member of the Communist party is a person who accepts the Programme and the statutes of the Communist Party of the country where he is domiciled, and those of the Communist International, submits to all decisions of the Party and the International, and pays his contributions regularly.

"Par. 4. The basis of the organization of the Communist party are the Communist cells in every industrial enterprise (workshop, factory, mine, store, farm, etc.); the cells group together all the members of the party, who work in said enterprise.

"Par. 5. The Communist International and its sections are organized on the principle of democratic centralization; subordinate organizations must implicitly obey the orders of the senior organizations; the decisions of the Communist International, as well as those of their respective directing organs must be carried out accurately and promptly. . . . Once a decision has been taken by a Congress of the Communist International, their sections of the respective organs directing them, that decision must be rigidly carried out.

"From March 21 to April 6, 1923, a session of the Executive Council of the Comintern (ECCI) met in Moscow under the chairmanship of Zinoviev. This was a very important session. It examined with great attention various questions of technique and laid, *inter alia*, the foundations for the secret activities of the Comintern in South America. The action of another meeting in 1926 may be summarized as follows: At present the stability of capitalism is endangered, on the one hand, by the existence of the USSR and on the other, by the weakening of British Capitalism, the development of the class struggle in Great Britain, and the Chinese National Revolution. Consequently, the Communist parties and the numerous international organizations created by the Comintern must not only consolidate the results already attained but also exploit every pretext for incitement to revolutionary action. The masses are to be enlightened on the hidden motives of the 'pseudo-pacifist' movement, (Locarno and Thoiry), and on the Imperialist character of the League of Nations, which is to be replaced by the Soviet United States of Europe. The Comintern, furthermore, insists on strenuous opposition to all attempts of the bourgeoisie to improve the lot of workers, such as profit-taking schemes or mixed syndicates of employers and workmen, etc., and also on the duty to combat the Socialists of the Second International as well as all information directed against the Soviet Government.

"The programme of the Comintern contains a special chapter under the following heading, 'Importance of the USSR—Its International Revolutionary Obligations!' It points out that the USSR is the home of the World Revolution and that the Communist party of the USSR is a section of the Comintern which directs the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the USSR and controls the Soviet Government. Stalin confirmed this direct subordination of the Soviet Government to the Communist Party of the USSR in his speech to the American workers' delegation, published in "Pravda" on Sept. 15, 1927. At the same time the leaders of the Union Communist Party, are also the leaders of the Communist International. They appoint its staff; while the ECCI is housed in a Soviet Government building in Moscow. The respective duties of Stalin in the Soviet Government, the Communist party and the Comintern, form a good illustration of the above. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the USSR, a member of the Council of Labor and Defense, the Secretary General of the Union Communist party and a member of the Presidency of the ECCI."

American-Russian Trade Relations as They are Today

ALTHOUGH there have been no official dealings between the two governments, trading between the United States and Russia has continued with few interruptions since the establishment of the Soviet Government.

This trading, however, has been between American individuals and corporations in their private capacity, on the one side, and the Russian Government on the other, since the only foreign trade done by Russia is done by the Government and not by private individuals.

In keeping aloof from this trading, the American Government has gone so far as to warn American bankers and others that the extension of financial credits to Russia must be at their own risk and that they could not look to the Government in the event they had trouble in collecting, and to forbid American bankers to act as agents for the Russian Government.

Several Russian trading agencies have set up offices in the United States to furnish trade information to American exporters and importers and to transact business direct on behalf of Russia. A list of them is given below.

American trade with Russia took a sharp drop in 1931 and 1932. Supporters of recognition of Russia have stressed this fact as an indication of the losses in trade America is sustaining by refusing to recognize Russia. Experts in commerce, however, lay the drop almost entirely to the refusal or inability of American exporters to extend long term credit to Russia. They are of the opinion that many American exports finally reach Russia through European countries—Germany, France, England and Italy. American products, they declare, are purchased in these countries on short term credits and resold to Russia on long term credits, but are, of course, listed as exports to the European countries although Russia is their ultimate destination.

That there is, as yet, no actual direct trading contact between the United States Government and the Soviet Government is indicated by the official statements on the loans for the sale of cotton.

On July 3, 1933, following reports from London that Assistant Secretary of State Moley had discussed the sale of cotton to Russia with Maxim Litvinoff, to be financed by the United States Government, Chairman Jones of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation announced that with the approval of the President and Secretary of the Treasury Woodin, the Directors of the Corporation had agreed to make loans to American exporters to finance the sale of sixty to eighty thousand bales of surplus cotton for shipment to Russia.

The loans to the exporters will be for one year at 5% interest, and will be secured by the notes of Amtorg Trading Corporation, an American corporation owned by Russia, unconditionally guaranteed by the State Bank of U. S. S. R.

Amtorg Trading Corporation will pay 30% of the purchase price in cash.

These loans will be made to any American exporter with resources and of standing satisfactory to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, from whom Amtorg Trading Corporation may purchase the surplus cotton. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is dealing with the American exporters and not with the Amtorg, and is holding the exporters responsible for the repayment of the loan.

The total amount of the loan to cover the estimated amount of cotton to be purchased by Amtorg is \$4,000,000.

Trade between the Soviet Union and the United States is handled in the main by four New York corporations, representing Soviet industrial and trading organizations. These firms are:

Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York, representatives in the United States of the principal trusts, syndicates, trading agencies and other economic organizations of the U. S. S. R., with the exception of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate and cooperative organizations.

All-Russian Textile Syndicate, New York, representatives of the Soviet All-Union Textile Syndicate, purchase American cotton for shipment to the Soviet Union.

Centrosoyus-America, New York, representatives of the Union of Consumers' Cooperatives of the U. S. S. R.

Selskhozjuz-America, New York, representatives of agricultural producers' cooperatives of the U. S. S. R.

The Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington, D. C., was opened several years ago under the direction of Boris Skvirsky, to furnish general trade information to American business men and to the Russian Government.

Mr. Skvirsky first came to America in 1921 on a mission from the Far East Republic, which later became a member of the U. S. S. R. The Russian Foreign Office directed him to remain in America as an unofficial trade representative and Secretary of the Information Bureau.

Foreign Trade of the United States with Soviet Russia—1918-1932

Year	Imports	Exports
1918	\$10,760,007	\$17,335,518
1919	9,663,038	82,436,185
1920	12,480,586	28,727,718
1921	1,043,260	15,540,136
1922	522,833	28,814,025
1923	1,481,699	7,308,389
1924	8,030,465	41,948,578
1925	13,119,673	68,906,060
1926	14,121,992	49,905,642
1927	12,876,790	64,921,693
1928	14,024,525	74,091,235
1929	22,555,714	84,725,205
1930	24,385,786	114,398,537
1931	13,206,393	103,668,808
1932	9,704,000	12,648,000

"Recognition"—What It Is and How It Is Extended

Books on international law are full of technical and, sometimes, hair-splitting definitions of the term "recognition." Boiled down to its essential features, recognition means that one Government accepts the other Government as the established Government of its country, exchanges diplomatic representatives with it and in most cases enters, with it, into a treaty covering the normal relationships between the two countries under the general provisions of existing international law.

If and when the present Administration takes up formally the question of recognizing and entering into formal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, the following procedure seems most probable:

- 1—The President through the Department of State would designate an individual or individuals to hold private conversations with Russian representatives to pave the way for formal negotiations. Announcement of these private conversations might or might not be made in advance—probably not. In fact, there are unconfirmed rumors in Washington that such conversations have already been held.
- 2—America or Russia, according to the agreement reached in the private conversations, would make a formal suggestion that negotiations be entered into, upon the acceptance of this suggestion, negotiators would be appointed. The two countries might immediately exchange diplomatic representatives, the Russian representative at Washington to conduct negotiations with the Department of State and the American representative at Moscow to negotiate simultaneously with the Russian Foreign Office. Or the two Governments might appoint special commissions to meet and negotiate.
- 3—Upon reaching an agreement the two Governments would exchange Ambassadors or Ministers and each set up an embassy or a legation in the other's capital. Or they might designate a regular member of the diplomatic corps to act as chargé d'affaires pending the setting up of embassies or legations. For example the United States might designate a member of its diplomatic corps stationed in a country near Russia, such as Poland, to act in that capacity.
- 4—A treaty might be negotiated at the outset or be left for later consideration. While the decision to recognize a foreign government is, under the Constitution, an executive function, neither the permanent establishment of formal diplomatic intercourse nor the ratification of a treaty can be accomplished without the consent of Congress. The State Department has on hand emergency funds from which the expenses of temporary diplomatic representatives may be defrayed, but to establish a permanent embassy or legation staff, definite appropriation by Congress for that specific staff must be made.

Thus, if a majority of both houses of Congress were opposed to the establishment of that particular embassy they could vote down the appropriation for the purpose requested by the Department of State. Both the House and the Senate must approve the appropriation.

In the case of a treaty negotiated by the Executive branch, it would have to be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate in order to become binding on the United States.

Rumors that President Roosevelt will recognize Russia before the meeting of Congress in order to forestall any attempts on the part of Senators or Representatives to block such action have been discounted by officials of the Department of State.

Without making a formal statement of any sort the Department of State has made it plain to questioners that in whatever act or series of acts which might lead to recognition, there must be an intent to recognize, or there is no recognition. In other words, no tricky or halfway steps will be taken. If a move toward recognition is made it will be in good faith and with full consideration of the established methods of procedure. This means that the Secretary of State will be in complete charge and that any negotiator or negotiators on behalf of the United States will function under the Department of State. In other words, any move the Administration may make will be open and above board.

The probable attitude of Congress toward the recognition of Russia cannot be predicted at this time. Up to date a majority of both houses has been hostile. Various moves in the House and Senate to this end have heretofore been choked off. In each Congress since 1921 Senator William E. Borah, of Idaho, (Republican), has introduced a resolution declaring that the Senate favors the recognition of Russia. Like all its predecessors, the present Borah Resolution (S. Res. 15, March 10, 1933) has been referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator William King, of Utah (Democrat), introduced on March 11, 1933, a resolution (S. Res. 21) providing that before the United States takes any steps toward recognition of Russia, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations be directed to make a full investigation of the question. The King resolution is also before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The debt question and the problem of the Third International are now considered as the main points in discussion looking toward recognition. All loans to previous Russian Governments have long since been repudiated by the Soviet Government. The United States has claimed that the Soviet Government should pay the \$27,583,071.37 balance due the United States from the Kerensky Government.

The operations of the Third International in fomenting Communist activities in other countries has been a perennial problem for the Soviet Government in its dealings with other Governments.

Should the U. S. Recognize Soviet Russia?

by Professor Raymond Moley

Former Assistant
Secretary of State

Arguments Favoring

As the years have passed, Russian-American relations have reached a state that may well be described as a stalemate. Public and official discussions relating to recognition are now some years past. They all ended on the note of refusal by this Government to yield a position it had earlier assumed.

Meanwhile, the government of Russia has remained secure. The theory upon which it rests has remained relatively the same. The faces change, just as they do in all countries; but the stability of the Bolshevik regime has become a fact to be reckoned with.

As the rehabilitation of the internal affairs of Russia has proceeded, moreover, her needs have reached out to American markets. Our trade with Russia is increasingly interesting to American business men, despite the fact that our political and commercial relations with her are abnormal. Sooner or later the question of whether it is possible for normal relations to be resumed is bound to obtrude itself in a most insistent way.

Until Wilson withheld recognition from Huerta's government in Mexico in 1913, the act of recognition was always regarded as a mere formality to be granted to a new regime as soon as it was apparent that it was in actual control. No approval of the form of government or of its morality was involved in the act of recognition. It was merely the assuming of normal diplomatic relations. This, up to the establishment of the Wilson doctrine, was our policy for over a hundred years.

What were the basic factors, then, really behind our policy of nonrecognition of the U. S. S. R.?

The American position was, in substance, that the Russian government should move to compensate private citizens of the United States for property confiscated, should recognize the indebtedness owing to the Government of the United States, and, finally, should prevent propaganda directed toward the overthrow of the form of government prevailing in the United States.

The position of the Soviet Republic in answer to these arguments was simply that there were counterclaims against the United States because of the "invasion" of Russian territory by American troops without a declaration of war. The Soviet Republic further maintained that propaganda was the work of the Third International and not of the Russian government.

And so the matter has stood and still stands.

As against our reasons for nonrecognition there are, powerful reasons for it. One of these reasons is a matter of principle. The other is a matter of self-interest. On

the basis of principle, as I have pointed out, our traditional policy has been to assume normal diplomatic relations with a government in actual control of a country. To withhold recognition unless certain terms are met, is to twist the meaning of the act.

Normal diplomatic relations with Russia could be resumed without a definite and final settlement as to the claims of our Government and citizens against her. And here it might be argued with a good deal of force that the default by foreign governments on loans owed to the United States never raises any question of the severance of diplomatic relations with them, nor does it in any sense impair the friendly relations which we maintain with them. It is my judgment that the considered opinion of the people of the United States would not support a policy of nonrecognition provided the question of claims was the sole question involved.

However, there is reason to believe that before the granting of recognition, the question of claims and counterclaims (both of which are relatively small) could be taken up and settled on the basis of mutual self-interest.

The question of propaganda is different. The Third International, as I understand it, is actually directed and controlled by the official heads of the Russian government. It is easy for them to say that the Third International is not an agency of the Russian government, but this is not, in effect, the case. This being true, a restoration of diplomatic relations would not mean normal relations with Russia. They would be abnormal. We could not, to put it another way, conceive of a propaganda agency in the United States, controlled by the President of the United States, carrying on propaganda against, let us say, Fascism in another country as a normal international relation. We would have exactly that situation; provided we recognized Russia without some assurance as to the question of propaganda.

It is not sufficient to say that their propaganda is not injurious to us. I could not conceive of its being successful in any event. In my opinion the people of the United States find their Government altogether too satisfactory to consider a change, even when presented by the most skilful propaganda agencies in the world. The carrying on of propaganda by a foreign government is, nevertheless, highly improper. Normal relations, therefore, ought to require strict engagements that the Third International, if under the direction of official Russians, be strictly kept out of the United States in all of its activities, or that it be strictly separated from the Russian government and the

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Should the U. S. Recognize Soviet Russia?

CON

Arguments Opposing

by Hon. Arthur R. Robinson

U. S. Senator,
Indiana, Republican

In normal times not more than 7 per cent of our production is sold abroad, and a comparatively small part even of this 7 per cent is sold to Russia. How any unprejudiced mind, therefore, could conceive that recognition of the Soviet Republics would in the slightest degree remedy our economic situation here is difficult, if not impossible, to understand. But propaganda is afloat on all sides, perhaps never more insistent than now, urging that we should go into immediate partnership with the Soviets.

The entire policy of the present Russian Government is subversive to the rest of the world. The Soviets have no regard for solemn treaties, frankly avowing that they will sign any pact that will further their interests with the unconcealed intention to violate it as soon as self-interest has been served.

Menjinsky, head of the secret police of Russia, and a power in the councils of the Soviet Government, and the Third International, which are precisely the same, made this deliberate statement:

"As long as there are idiots to take our signature seriously, and to put their trust in it, we must promise everything that is being asked, and as much as one likes, if we can only get something tangible in exchange."

In the face of these facts, it is passing strange that anyone in America should urge official recognition of that system.

At the present time, representatives of the Moscow masters are busily engaged all over this country in creating dissension and dissatisfaction among our people. They are violently opposed to our philosophy, and day and night are working industriously to overthrow our Government.

That is the situation under present conditions. What would it be if they were officially recognized? What would recognition mean?

Well, in the first place they would have an elaborate embassy located in Washington, fully staffed, entitled to many immunities, and this machinery would unquestionably be used as the central point for carrying on their admitted efforts to destroy the American Republic.

In the Soviet Embassy here, the seditious concoction would be brewed and from this embassy would emanate to all points of the United States, the vicious propaganda calculated to poison American public opinion against our own institutions.

Dangerous as their activities are to our peace and welfare under present conditions, they would be infinitely worse if conducted under the official cloak of American

recognition. The fact is indisputable, that the Soviets have undertaken to abolish both religion and the family. Here again, we may safely rely on the language of their own leaders.

So far as Russia is concerned, Lenin is the founder of the system, and since his death has been deified by the Communists and is worshipped practically as a god.

In 1923, speaking before the Department of Education in Russia, Lenin said:

"Give us the child for 8 years and it will be a Bolshevik forever. We have struck the kings from the earth * * * now let us strike the King from the skies."

"We must hate—hatred is the basis of communism. Children must be taught to hate their parents if they are not Communists. If they are, then the child need not respect them; need no longer worry about them."

These are not the words of antirecognition propagandists against bolshevism—they are the words of Lenin himself, the founder of the philosophy, or, in any event, the man who put it into practice on the largest scale the world has ever known.

Again, Lunacharsky said, at Moscow:

"We hate Christianity and Christians; even the best of them must be regarded as our worst enemies. They preach love of one's neighbor and mercy, which is contrary to our principles."

"Christian love is an obstacle to the development of the revolution. Down with the love of one's neighbors. What we need is hatred. We must know how to hate; only thus shall we conquer the universe."

Another quotation from Lenin:

"Religion must be abolished. The best country is a godless country. If religion will pass out quietly, our attitude will be one of benevolent tolerance. But if it resists we will hasten its exit by violence proportioned to its resistance."

Religious persecution is the order of the day there, nor is any religion immune. All are proscribed, and the effort to dignify atheism as a national religion for the Russian people is unconcealed.

The family as an institution has all but disappeared. Children are separated from parents; wives are separated from husbands; marriage is debauched and divorce is worse than a travesty.

They have undertaken to abolish God and have destroyed the family, and over these accomplishments the Moscow masters gloat with satisfaction.

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Moley Cont'd

officials of the Russian government. This would be a matter for negotiation in any preliminaries to recognition. Intelligent observers feel that this point could be carried by the United States if it should insist upon it; but it would not be easy.

This sketch of the principles that are behind the political recognition of Russia has in no sense taken account of the compelling practical reasons that exist for attempting to clear the way for recognition. Russia is an enormous potential customer of American goods. Its needs are of two sorts. In the first place, it needs vast stores of consumers' goods and raw materials to tide the population of Russia over its immediate situation—such as cotton, copper and other products.

It is probably within the present planning of Russia to move as far as possible in the direction of making itself self-sustaining with regard to these products. The market for them would, therefore, be temporary. But even a temporary market at this time might give the United States a sufficient impulse toward recovery worth all the effort it would cost, provided, of course, the Russians were able to secure the credits necessary for these purchases.

The other form of purchase that the Russians are in market to buy consists of a vast variety of producers' goods. In other words, the policy of the Russian government is to purchase sufficient machinery so that ultimately it can become self-sustaining. Here again, however, the immediate purchase of quantities of machinery of various kinds, even though it would not represent a continuing commerce, would give our lagging industry a fillip of enormous value. Again, of course, the question of credits is paramount.

Three times in the past few months the United States has taken positive action toward normal relations with Russia. In the first place, the President, in addressing the heads of the nations of the world in May included Russia as one of his correspondents. The United States thus indicated that it officially knew of the existence of the Russian Republic. The second instance was in the instructions given to the delegates to the economic conference, permitting them to meet and talk with delegates of the Soviet republic in the same manner as with the delegates of other nations. The third instance was the sale of cotton to Russia with the aid of the financing provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

It is interesting to note that none of these three steps caused any widespread discussion in the United States as to their propriety. This fact seems to indicate that public opinion is reaching a state of mind with regard to Russia which offers some hope for a calm consideration of the problems involved in recognition.

It is impossible to point out in this short summary any of the possible political advantages in the recognition of Russia. We do not need to grow enthusiastic about the Russian form of government to recognize that Russia is, by every circumstance, a peaceful neighbor. It would be one of the last nations in the world with which we could possibly conceive of having war. This is a further reason

for feeling that negotiations after recognition, however difficult, might be pursued in order that there be some chance of permanent adjustment.

There are interesting possibilities at this time in the restoration of normal relations with Russia.—*Extracts, see 8, p. 256.*

by Hon. William E. Borah

U. S. Senator, Idaho, Republican

THERE is a scarcely a matter of international importance that would not be favorably affected by the establishment of diplomatic relations between this country and the government of Russia.

We are all interested in world peace, in disarmament, in the restoration of economic conditions and the improvement of trade, in improving unemployment. The Russian question involves all these matters.

Russia is the greatest undeveloped market in the world for our goods. Other nations are taking every opportunity to improve their trade relations with Russia. We read occasionally that this or that nation is having a controversy with Russia, but investigation shows that the controversy always ends up by improved trade relations.

The fear as to the effect of propaganda in the United States is based upon the supposition that the intelligence, character, and patriotism of the people of the United States are matters of grave doubt. It is my belief that if you would empty the entire amount of propaganda which is supposed to be gathered upon the borders of the United States into the laps of the people of the United States it would not have the slightest effect upon the thought and purpose of the people of the United States or their loyalty to our Government. The people of the United States are perfectly capable of reading, reflecting, and thinking over the different propositions which are presented to the world in different ways and of determining for themselves what is wise and what is not. I am not willing to base our foreign policies upon the theory that our own people are weaklings susceptible to every intellectual wind that blows.

The fact of having an embassy established here would not aid or facilitate the Russians spreading propaganda in the United States in any substantial respect whatever. One can purchase any information he desires about Russia.

No such literature is being denied the people of the United States. They know precisely what is going on in Russia; they know all that is going on so far as information can be carried by any kind of propaganda, pro or con.

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Robinson *Cont'd*

These two institutions, religion and the family, held sacred by Americans everywhere, have been trodden under foot and practically abolished.

Who would wish to have the American people go into partnership, through the channels of diplomatic relations, with a system like that?

The Soviet dictators are carrying forward an ambitious plan for world-wide dumping as a means of economic disturbance leading to revolution in non-Communist nations.

But notwithstanding all known facts to the contrary, some Americans insist on contending that recognition would be a good thing for us economically.

Well, in the first place, trade has been going on with Russia on quite a large scale for a number of years and it has brought no noticeable economic benefit to us. The truth is, when we do trade with that country, Russia demands cash from us on our purchases and longtime credit on what she buys. This, notwithstanding the fact that on former occasions she has deliberately repudiated her financial obligations to our people; and the present Soviet Government insists that a treaty is only a "scrap of paper," to be violated whenever her own self-interest suggests such action.

The truth is Russia owes every nation with whom she has dealt. Italy, England, France, Germany, the United States—all tell the same story.

When it is considered that she is only one of the many countries of the globe buying from us, and that our entire export is normally less than 7 per cent of our production, it becomes perfectly apparent that no possible economic advantage can be gained by official recognition.

Of course, as I see it, recognition of the Soviet Government would be unwise from any standpoint; but its avowed purpose to destroy organized government everywhere, it seems to me, makes recognition unthinkable.—*Extracts, see 6, page 256.*

by Hon. Hamilton Fish, jr.

Member, U. S. House of Representatives, New York, Republican

THE recognition of the Soviet Government, controlled by the Russian Communist Party, which seeks to sow seeds of class hatred, atheism, and world revolution in every non-Communist country, would be a lie to international law and to official diplomatic relations. Former Secretary of State Elihu Root summed up the American position in the following able and concise statement: "The recognition of one government by another is not a mere courtesy. It is an act having a definite and specific meaning, and it involves an acceptance by the recognizing government of the principles, purposes, and avowed intentions of the recognized government as being in confor-

mity with the rules which govern the conduct of civilized nations toward each other. For the United States to recognize Russia would be to publicly acknowledge that the avowed purpose of the present Russian Government to overthrow our system of government is consistent with international friendship. Of course, that would be a lie."

The American people will not compromise with any attempt of a foreign government to interfere with our domestic institutions, and will not tolerate the revolutionary activities and vicious and diseased propaganda of the Communist Internationale directed at our civil liberties, our free institutions, and our form of government. I decline to argue whether the Soviet Government is strictly responsible for the acts of the Communist Internationale further than to quote Zinovieff, formerly head of the Communist Internationale, regarding its relations to the Soviet Government: "It is the foundation and roof of the same building; one belongs to the other." The Russian Communist Party, the Soviet Government, and Red Internationale have interlocking directorates, and all three take their orders from the political bureau headed by Stalin and Molotov. Its fundamental aim is world revolution and the establishment of a Soviet dictatorship throughout the world by force and violence."

We do not intend to recognize Soviet Russia, because we do not propose to have the soviet consulates established in all our industrial cities, north and south, to become nests of Communist propaganda and class hatred, as they have done in Germany, China, and elsewhere. We are not afraid of such revolutionary propaganda in our midst, but we do not propose to admit it any more than we would such dread diseases as leprosy, bubonic plague, or typhus.

It is a libel against the American people to say that they are afraid of Communist propaganda. Why, the Regular Army, National Guard, American Legion, and Veterans of Foreign Wars could—using a Russian word—"liquidate" all the Communists in the United States in a few weeks' time, in case of any attempt at a Communist revolution. But, in the midst of our present economic crisis, it would be foolhardy to recognize Soviet Russia and thereby permit the Communist Internationale, under diplomatic immunity, to become established in our industrial cities, in the farm belt, and among the Negroes of the South to provide organized leadership to revolutionary activities in the United States.

Just because other nations have recognized Soviet Russia, for selfish and ulterior motives, is no reason why we should, and besides, most of these nations are already sorry. France recognized Soviet Russia, hoping to settle or adjust vast pre-war loans made by the French people to Russia; Italy because she wants to buy wheat, coal, lumber, and oil cheaply. England did so because of the platform pledges of the Socialist Labor Party recently repudiated by the English people. Germany recognized Russia, because prior to the World War she did \$500,000,000 worth of export trade with Russia, which is her natural market and was in dire need to restore such a nearby

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Borah Cont'd

There is no attempt, in any way of which I know, to prevent the circulation of any facts or arguments as to the wisdom or unwisdom of the great experiment in Russia or any circumstances touching Russian life or conditions in Russia.

Whatever else may be said of the leaders in Russia they know perfectly well that they could not destroy the Government of the United States if they should undertake to do so. How are they going to destroy it? Are they going to land an army or are they going to seduce our own people into their belief? One or the other must be chosen, I suppose. I fear neither and neither will be undertaken.

I have no fear of their landing an army, even if their Ambassador were here. And I have no fear of their propaganda though it come in carload lots.

It will be remembered—I think it was in April 1792 or 1793—that Washington advised them that he was going to consider the question of the recognition of the improvised revolutionary government of France. When President Washington was asked why he would recognize a government in whose principles he utterly disbelieved, he stated that it was a bloody road over which France was traveling to democracy, but it was the only road over which she could ever reach a democratic form of government. Neither Washington nor Hamilton nor Jefferson believed in the bloody tenets of the revolutionary leaders of France, but they believed in the great principles which those leaders dimly grasped.

What was happening in England? If you turn back and read the speeches of William Pitt in February 1801 against the recognition of France, you will find there the same declarations that are now being made against Russia. It was said that France would not keep her treaty promises; that France had agreed to send her army to any people who wanted to overthrow their government; that they had dethroned order and law and ridiculed religion and disowned God.

When finally the time came, some years afterward, that England felt it necessary to recognize the Government of France, Charles James Fox called attention to the fact that they would have done better to have followed the great western leader, George Washington, and to have recognized the French Government years previously.

We are told that a great many of the countries which have recognized Russia have had difficulties and that the recognition program has not been satisfactory. It reminds me to recall while we read of difficulties we also read that year after year they enlarge their trade agreement with Russia. Only lately have important treaties been concluded with France and Poland. I venture the opinion that the controversy which is now going on between Great Britain and Russia will finally result in an enlarged trade agreement between those countries.

Japan recognized Russia several years ago and in a public statement made the other day by her Premier said that the relationship of the two countries had been entirely satisfactory since the recognition.

There always will be disturbances in the relations between governments, whether there is a full recognition or partial recognition or no recognition; but the governments which have recognized Russia, with one single exception, have continued in that relationship.

However, suppose we put aside all the questions of immediate benefit and judge the situation from the world condition of affairs. How are we going to adjust world economic affairs and leave out Russia? How are we going to disarm without taking into consideration Russia? How are we going to establish peace throughout the world with one-sixth of the earth's surface outside of the family of nations? How are we going to establish an increased price of world commodities without taking into consideration the greatest natural wealth and productive power in the world today outside of the United States, and that is Russia? How can we restore economic solidarity and adjust the problems which are driving the whole world to misery and ruin and leave out Russia?

You meet Russia at every move. You may ignore her, but at every gathering where men meet to solve the world's problems, there is Russia. We cannot avoid taking her into consideration. Why not, therefore, meet her as one of the family of nations, and by doing so greatly advance the solutions of the problems for which the world anxiously awaits?—*Extracts, see 5, p. 256.*

by Hon. Hiram Johnson

U. S. Senator, California, Republican

NORMAL relations with Russia would aid domestic relief and would tend to remove perils from the Far East. Moreover, it would be wise, sensible, and statesmanlike.

There are billions of dollars' worth of future orders in Russia for American workers to fill, and in these times it is simply economic idiocy for America, by its policies, to preclude Americans from trade and commerce which so readily could be obtained.

Secondly, Japan has already seized Manchuria and part of inner Mongolia. A spark may set off the powder barrel at any time. Japan seems to think that Russia's downfall would be acclaimed the world over. Some gesture on the part of the United States, therefore, could well be made to rid her of any such ideas.

The United States does not want another world war. Japan would not have the moral support of this country in an attempted conquest of Russia and we should make this clear. Some move in the direction of normal relationships with Russia at this time would do more to remove the perils from the Far East and therefore from the world in general, than any other single act.—*Extracts, see 2, p. 256.*

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Fish Cont'd

market for her goods. No nation has paid so dearly for recognition as Germany; she has been overrun with Russian communists and today communism is a serious menace to the very existence of the German Republic.

No nation has been harder hit by the so-called world or capitalistic depression than has Russia. Its exports, mainly wheat, oil, and lumber, receive a wretchedly low price in the world markets, hardly more than the cost, even with forced labor paid 15 cents a day on a gold basis, plus transportation. The biggest and most used argument advanced in the United States for recognition of Russia, is that such recognition would create a market for our surplus goods. The fact is, the United States, which has declined to recognize Soviet Russia, has done four times as much export trade with Russia since the armistice, right up to the beginning of world depression, in 1930, than she did prior to the World War with czar's regime, and all the other big nations that have recognized Soviet Russia are doing many times less trade with her.

Soviet Russia is intensely anxious for recognition from the United States at the present time, not only to reestablish her waning prestige at home, due to crop failures and the discontent and misery of her people, but because all sources of credit are drying up, and she needs to float loans, without which her gigantic program of world economic competition, capitalistic ruin, and world revolution will collapse and sink into oblivion.—*Extracts, see 10, page 256.*

by William A. Green

President, American
Federation of Labor

LABOR'S opposition to the recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States rests upon a broad, deep, and unselfish basis. It has maintained a consistent attitude in holding firmly for the acceptance of the conditions and principles set up by President Wilson and approved by each succeeding administration as a prerequisite to Russian Soviet recognition.

The advocates of the recognition of Soviet Russia have shifted their positions. Originally they sought to influence public opinion with the argument that a de facto government had been established in Russia and because that government had been recognized by most of the great powers throughout the world the United States should do likewise. Now, the advocates of Soviet recognition assert that recognition would mean that great material benefits would accrue to the people of the United States through the sale of manufactured goods, commodities and American products to the Soviet Government and the Russian people. The American people are asked to abandon the moral, spiritual, and ethical basis upon which opposition to Russian recognition originally rested and yield to the argument of materialism.

Some of the owners of industry as well as some of

those who control our financial institutions have accepted this argument and have become the strongest advocates of the recognition of the Soviet Government. The appeal of selfishness and of profit was powerful to this group. They were willing to abandon principle for profit. Labor, however, refused to respond to such an appeal or be influenced by such an argument.

Labor holds that the preservation of the principles of self-government, the right to live unmolested, without the threat and menace of world revolutions, is of greater value than the creation of material wealth or the enjoyment of profits gained through the sale of goods to a foreign nation. Labor places our common heritage of our representative form of government, with its free institutions, above and beyond material values either in the form of an enlarged export trade or profits earned as a result of the ownership and management of industry. It would seem, in these days of distressing unemployment, that if the people of the United States were to be influenced in favor of the recognition of Soviet Russia because of materialistic reasons or the creation of work opportunities because of an enlarged foreign market that labor, instead of the owners of industry, would be the first to yield to such an argument. It is this attitude of labor which gives emphasis to the assertion that labor's opposition to the recognition of Soviet Russia rests upon a broad, deep, and unselfish basis.

To those who are familiar with the facts the economic argument in favor of the development of a potential market through Russian recognition carries no weight. Trading with Russia has been developed and carried forward with indifferent success. Russia bought goods from us without interference and on the same terms as goods were sold to the peoples of other countries. In 1931 the United States sold goods to Russia valued at \$103,000,000. The figures show that the nation's export to that country dropped to \$12,500,000 last year. The highest point of the sale of goods to Russia was reached in the year 1931, even though our Government had maintained its steadfast opposition to the recognition of Soviet Russia. For this reason no one can allege that the reduction in sales of goods from \$103,000,000 to \$12,500,000 was due to the fact that the United States failed to recognize Soviet Russia. The probabilities are that this loss was caused by reason of the competition with goods manufactured in other countries at low wages or because more favorable credit facilities had been placed at the disposal of Russian buyers.

Trade relations with Russia can be greatly facilitated if American manufacturers are willing to sell goods to Russia on credit, and in the light of the history of the Soviet Government, run the risk of having its obligations repudiated. The nation which will agree to give Russia a charge account, trusting Russian buyers for deferred payments, can increase its sale of goods in Soviet Russia regardless of governmental recognition. It is the fixed opinion of many representatives of labor that no increase in the sale of American-manufactured goods to Russia

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by Hon. Henry A. Rainey

Speaker, U. S. House of Representatives, Illinois, Democrat

OUR failure to recognize Russia is an economic crime. In 1928 there were eighty-four ships flying the American flag plying between the United States and the Black Sea Russian ports. This has decreased greatly in recent years. In 1930 there were thirty-five. What little cargo now goes to Russia is carried by tramp steamers. In these times I think we should recognize Russia as a means of giving us an outlet for our surplus goods. I am informed that Russia canceled thousands of dollars' worth of orders recently, primarily because the Hawley-Smoot tariff act barred imports into the United States of goods made by forced labor. If Russia can't sell to us, she won't buy from us, and there is no forced labor in Russia. . . .

The time has come for us to change our policy and recognize Russia and get some of her trade. . . . It is shortsighted statesmanship that keeps us from selling goods in Russia and it is up to the Administration to recognize that nation. We recognize a revolutionary junta in South America two or three days after it has won an uprising.

Nearly every other country in the world does recognize Russia. They're all working to get her trade. Yet we stay back and let our factories stop running and our people stay idle. That is foolish.—*Extracts, see 2, p. 256.*

by Hon. Robert F. Wagner

U. S. Senator, N. Y., Republican

THE policy of non-recognition of Russia is rapidly acquiring with age the characteristics of an unreasoned taboo. It began as a temporary measure. It has become a national habit. As is frequently true in such cases the premises that originally furnished a reason for the policy have been gradually abandoned and new premises from time to time substituted in their place. Once we heard much of the instability of the Russian government as ground for non-recognition. At the present time the very contrary is asserted. The probability of the success of the Russian experiment and the consequent competition with our own industries are the arguments most often used for continuing the present official attitude.

It seems absurd that two nations at peace with each other, trading with each other, should not be on official speaking terms. Recognition would promote international

understanding at a time when such understanding is vital to the peace of Europe and the peace of the world. Recognition would stimulate trade between the United States and Soviet Russia and thus provide many opportunities for American employment.

The resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia, of course, does not imply approval of Russian doctrines. No more did our recognition of the former Tsarist Russia, impute to us approval of that autocracy. Some lay great stress upon the danger to our institutions if exposed to Russian ideas. I have no such fear. I have sufficient faith in the American system to believe that it will come out the winner in a free field.—*Extracts, see 2, p. 256.*

by Hon. Bronson Cutting

U. S. Senator, New Mexico, Republican

THE economic crisis in the United States emphasizes the folly of ignoring our one great potential customer, a customer who needs exactly what we have to sell. In essence, however, the problem is not new. If we had followed the continuous line of American precedent from 1793, the Soviet Government would have been recognized in November, 1917. Such recognition would not have implied any approval of Bolshevik theories or practices. It would simply have acknowledged the actual, de facto government. Failure to act in 1917 is directly responsible for the controversies over debts and propaganda which have formed the pretext for our departure from American traditions.

Such controversies grow increasingly trivial and irrelevant. The Kerensky debts, which Russia has never declined to discuss, form an insignificant fraction of what Russia owes to the European countries which have recognized her. Surely, at this particular stage of history, it can scarcely be argued that we should cancel normal relations with every government which shows reluctance to pay its international debts.

As to propaganda, does anyone still believe that a few agents of the somewhat naive Third International can suffice to overturn the faith of the American people in their own government and institutions? As Radek once said, "Revolutions are not carried in suitcases. They cannot be imported; they grow." Misery and despair are the true breeders of revolution. In the past two years the bankruptcy of economic and political leadership has made Communists out of many American citizens whom foreign agitators could never have reached. These people cannot be reconverted by suppression or distortion of the truth; still less by the withholding of diplomatic recognition. They will give their support to the system which wins out in the open market of free discussion and free competition. And those who profess the greatest confidence in the superiority of American institutions should welcome their submission to the acid test.—*Extracts, see 2, p. 256.*

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Green Cont'd

would be brought about because of recognition. Trade relations with any nation, recognized or unrecognized, must depend upon the operation of economic and financial laws. The nation which offers its goods at the lowest price and sells these goods on the basis of long-time credits will be favored in the establishment of any form of international relationship.

The bid for Russian recognition upon the basis of increased trade and the development of a potential market for the sale of American-made goods is not supported by the facts. I make the bold assertion that no profitable increase in trade with Soviet Russia can possibly follow governmental recognition. It is a false argument, alluring in appearance, and one which appeals to the material instinct of those who are willing to surrender principle for mere gain. It does not and will not influence labor.

There is another, more serious phase of trade relationship with Russia which must be considered and which is of tremendous importance to labor. It is a recognized principle in trade relationship that a buying nation must also be permitted to sell. That would mean that if American manufacturers sell goods to Soviet Russia the markets of the United States must be open to the sale of Russian goods. We must buy from a nation to which we sell goods. Under ordinary circumstances nations exchange goods but if such exchange would take place between the United States and Russia, American labor fully understands it would be compelled to compete with forced labor, controlled by a dictatorship. Labor in the United States does not welcome such an experience. The miners of the anthracite region of Pennsylvania and the men who work in the lumber camps of the Northwest have felt the effects which result from the sale of anthracite coal and lumber produced under conditions of labor existing in Russia which permitted the sale of these products in the United States at a price so low as to undermine the wage level established in the anthracite coal regions and in the lumber camps of our nation. The situation became so serious as to arouse the interest of the working people associated with the anthracite coal and lumber industries and as a result of their protests restrictions were imposed under the provisions of existing laws relating to dumping, unfair competition, and forced labor.

Labor holds that the Soviet Government is not entitled to nor should it be accorded recognition until it disavows its declaration of world revolution as made through the Third International. It seems inconceivable to labor that our own Government should recognize any government which had proclaimed to the world through a political or economic organization which it had created and controlled that its international policy was to overthrow the Government of the United States by force. The Soviet Government has never withdrawn nor modified that declaration. It is still a part of the political creed and the fixed policy of the Soviet Government. Its purpose is clear. Its intent is made plain. Its policy has been outlined. It is directed against existing governments. Our own nation cannot proceed blindly nor ignorant of facts.

The members of trade-unions in the United States

clash with the Communists who seek to dominate and destroy the American trade-union movement. While certain representatives loudly proclaim their intent and purpose to refrain from engaging in destructive practices, their chosen representatives carry out instructions given them as opportunity and circumstances permit. The trade-unions must be constantly on guard in order to protect and preserve their organizations, their funds, their ideals, and their principles. It is not enough to say, in these trying days, that distressed and hard-driven unemployed workers are not susceptible to the beguiling influence of Communism and Communistic representatives. Surely, a government clothed with the responsibility of jealously guarding the safety of all its people cannot afford to expose its suffering people to the destructive philosophy preached and practiced by the Soviet Government. That is what our Government would do if it extended recognition to Soviet Russia, opened wide the doors of the Government to the establishment of Soviet headquarters and Soviet agencies in every city, State, and community throughout the land. No good purpose could be served and no interest in America could be benefited or advanced through the recognition of Soviet Russia under the present circumstances. To the contrary, we would be assuming a great risk by taking such a step. As in other nations, great injury might result from such governmental action.

While labor realizes that all is not well in our own land, and that there are many wrongs which must be righted, it believes that the instrumentalities of our representative government, provided for in our laws and our Constitution, offer the means by which the people can change governmental policy and our form of government as well. We claim the right to do this without interference from outside sources. Until the Soviet Government withdraws its avowed declaration to promote revolution and to overthrow our Government by force, the American Federation of Labor will vigorously oppose the recognition of Soviet Russia.

Upon this basis labor has taken its firm stand. The best and finest, as well as all that is sacred in our social, political, and religious life, call for the maintenance and observance of this position on the part of American labor. We know that there are other groups, strong in numbers, which stand with labor upon this great issue. We join hands and minds with these groups in protecting our Nation against a political philosophy which teaches violence and world revolution.—*Extracts, see 1, p. 256.*

by Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, S. J. Ph. D.

Vice-President, Georgetown University

RECOGNITION of the Soviet Union ultimately and basically is not a question of repudiated debts or confiscated property, of Communists on soap-boxes.

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by Alfred E. Smith

Editor, The New Outlook,
Former Governor of New York

I STRONGLY advocate the recognition of Russia. I have come to this conclusion for a number of reasons and after analyzing a great many objections.

One of the principal objections is that Russia owes us money because of debts contracted before we entered the war. As a matter of fact, it turns out that we sold considerable material to the Kerensky government on the supposition that Kerensky would last. A good deal of what we sent over never reached Kerensky. The amount involved is not great. It is true also that private property of American citizens was taken by the Soviet Government after the revolution. So was all other private property. As against this, we must not forget that we maintained armies in Russia and Siberia, which did considerable damage and cost the natives much money, at a time when we were not at war with Russia and had no possible excuse under international law for keeping troops on her territory. In any adjustment this army invasion must be balanced against whatever Russia owes us.

Then we have the argument that we should not trade with Russia because she does not keep her agreements. The fact of the matter is that we are dealing with Russia every day under cover, and that Russia has in this country the Amtorg Trading Corporation, an official body which is carrying on negotiations for exchange of goods every day, and which certainly should not be permitted to function on American soil if trade relations are forbidden. If, on the other hand, we are trading under cover, we might better trade in the open.

Another argument against Russian recognition is that we disapprove of their form and theories of government. This argument runs counter to every sound American tradition. Thomas Jefferson told us that if we did not like our own Government we should do away with it and build up a new one. We have no right to tell another nation how it shall govern itself.

Russian propaganda in this and other countries is also offered as a reason against recognition. There is considerable doubt as to whether the Russian Government actually is attempting to undermine other governments. If so, I am not afraid of what it will accomplish here. There were orators spouting in Union Square when I was a boy, long before communism was heard of, and before socialism became respectable. At that time the fear was that the socialists would overthrow the Government. As long as we stick to our fundamental principles of free speech and a free press, as a safety valve for the more excited and explosive elements in the community, we need have no fear of foreign propaganda.

We are not proposing to withdraw our diplomatic representatives from Germany because Hitler and his party have come into power, although there is much in their philosophy which does not appeal to Americans. If anything, they are more extreme than the Communists. More-

over, if the Communist Party in Germany were to succeed Hitler, I don't think we would refuse to recognize the new administration.

My impression is that we could reestablish relations with Russia on favorable terms to both countries if we made the right sort of gesture.—*Extracts, see 11, page 256.*

by Edwin L. Dickinson

Professor, University of Michigan

If the United States' indictment of the Soviet Government is not fully sustained, then the continued withholding of recognition can be justified only on the ground that communistic and capitalistic states cannot live together in the same world because a communistic state is fundamentally unworthy. Such a position requires a violent break with traditional American recognition practice; it is an officious intervention in the internal affairs of another state; it is likely to prove even more costly than the ill-fated military intervention in Russia of 1918-1920.

A departure from traditional American practice, particularly in case of a country of Russia's magnitude and importance, is a costly and dangerous experiment. It is productive of uncertainty and confusion in the field of law as well as in the field of national policy. Its disturbing effects upon the processes of law, both national and international, have been too little appreciated.

In national law, there is resulting uncertainty and confusion wherever Russian public rights, Russian nationals, Russian transactions, or Russian laws are concerned. The confusion spares neither communist nor anti-communist; it may prejudice American no less than Russian interests. Thus, the Russian Government has no standing in court, so long as recognition is withheld, either as party defendant or party plaintiff. There is no authority which is fully competent to conserve Russian state property, whether funds, ships, or other species of property, within the country, nor can Russian state property be brought into the country under the normal safeguards of public ownership. Russian nationals may be admitted as usual, and may even be naturalized with slight modifications of the prescribed forms, but troublesome questions arise concerning their privileges, protection, and deportation.

The resulting uncertainty is strikingly exemplified in the field of the conflict of laws. Should Russian laws and decrees have the effect generally attributed to foreign laws where the foreign government is recognized, or should they have no effect whatever, or is there a middle ground which courts are required to explore in the situation which is presented in consequence of the withholding of recognition? There may be questions, for example, with respect to the effect to be attributed to Russian marriage, divorce, or legitimation; questions as to the proper rule to govern commercial contracts made or to be performed in Russia;

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Two civilizations, diametrically opposed in their principles, their practices, and their objectives, come face to face before the supreme tribunal of public opinion in a manner that has no precedent in international relations. The form of government which Soviet Russia would impose by force on the entire world is too well known to need rehearsal here. Suffice it to say that it proposes, as a government policy, to abolish universally every shred of the democratic ideal embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Bill of Rights. That is the plain meaning of section 1, paragraph 9, of the Soviet constitution, which affirms that what has been accomplished in Russia is a "decisive step toward the union of the toilers of all countries into one world Soviet Socialist Republic." Paragraph 7, same section, declares Soviet jurisdiction to be "international in its class character." Article 72 of that same constitution—not article 72 of the Communist Party nor the reiterated articles of provocation sponsored by exuberant individual Communists, but article 72 of the organic law of a sovereign state provides in judicial language that the capital of this contemplated Socialist league of nations shall be the city of Moscow. And, further, specific pronouncements by responsible Soviet officials explain that this conquest of all non-Communist states is to be achieved by force of arms. Moscow is not content to live and let live.

Nor is this hostility merely academic or theoretical. It has been reduced to concrete form in the two practical agencies which the Communist Party of Russia created after the second Russian revolution. The domestic instrument contrived to insure the permanency of Marxian communism on Russian soil is called the Soviet Government, which becomes thereby, in Mr. Zinoviev's celebrated phrase, a sort of fifth wheel. The external apparatus for the conquest of the non-Communist world is called the Third International. Both are the direct creations and active agents of the political bureau of the Communist Party. These two agencies of world revolution are, in the words of Ramsay McDonald, "organically connected." The nations of the world have refused to accept the stale pretext that the Third International is a private organization over which the Soviet Government has no control. It is not a private organization and never was. It was founded by responsible officials of the Soviet Government while holding office, was convoked by the official Soviet telegraph agency, its first meetings were held in a government building within the Kremlin, and its revolutionary program published in the official state organ, *Izvestia*, on January 24, 1919. Its subversive activities from that date to this are matter of public record.

We have never questioned nor do we now question the right of the Russian people to set up any form of government they see fit to endure. All such accusations are either sheer ignorance or malicious attempts to deceive the simple-minded. We were the first nation in the world to recognize the Russian revolution by extending full diplomatic recognition to the new government on March 22, 1917, one week after the abdication of Nicholas II. What we do question and refuse to tolerate is the insupportable

arrogance of the Communist Party, which came into power on November 7, 1917, and which assumes to dictate to us the form of government we shall have in these United States. Our motive is not fear, which is the only justification some advocates of recognition can find for our present policy. The motive is self-respect and a decent regard for sovereignty under international law.

Rightly, then, has the Government of the United States refused to compromise with those two allied agencies—the Soviet Government and the Third International—refused categorically and without reservation for the very reasons once advanced by a distinguished American lawyer trying a case of conspiracy. He argued that in any common pact directed against public security, the act of one member is the act of all, and the guilt of all is the guilt of each, after the conspiracy is formed. "In other words," he explained to the jury, "if you and I join together for the doing of an unlawful act, the fact that you may remain ten miles away while I go and commit the crime does not relieve you either legally or morally or exempt you from punishment." So argued Senator William E. Borah when he so ably defended the people of his State against organized lawlessness at Wallace, Idaho, on July 27, 1899, and won his case. He has since become the most outstanding of those who advocate immediate recognition of Soviet Russia. Extraordinary lapse of memory.

On May 6, 1929, there was held in Moscow a meeting of the so-called "American Commission of the Third International." Mr. Stalin pointed out at great length to the visiting delegates from the United States the most efficacious means for drawing revolutionary profit from the prevailing economic crisis in their homeland. In other words, the ruler of the Soviet Government, while encouraging his American agents in their use of purring platitudes and honeyed phrases calculated to obtain diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, drops the mask in Moscow and instructs his American visitors thus:

"I think, comrades, that the American Communist Party is one of those few Communist Parties in the world upon which history has conferred a task of a decisive character from the viewpoint of the world revolutionary movement. * * * The crisis of world capitalism is developing at an increased speed and is bound to extend also to American capitalism. * * * It is necessary that the American Communist Party should be able to meet this historical moment fully armed, and to take the lead in the coming class battles in America. * * * With this end in view the American Communist Party must be improved and Bolshevized. * * * With this end in view we must strain our efforts to forge genuinely revolutionary groups and genuinely revolutionary leaders of the proletariat who would be able to lead the many millions of the American labor classes into the revolutionary class battles."

Incomplete thinkers appeal to the historic precedent that we recognized the French Revolution despite the inflammatory language and internationalism of its leaders. Similarly, the argument is often advanced that we recognized the Russian Czars, recognized the Turks, Mussolini

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questions of liability for civil wrongs committed in Russia; questions of property in movables or immovables having a situs in Russia; and questions of the effect of Russian laws and decrees creating, destroying, or nationalizing private corporations. The answers to these questions and to many others, difficult enough under ordinary circumstances, become much more difficult when recognition is withheld.

In international law, the uncertainty and confusion produced by the withholding of recognition, though less easily measured, are undoubtedly more serious. Recognition serves a unique function in the international legal society which is quite unlike anything with which we are familiar in national legal systems. It is an assurance that the recognized government will be permitted to work out its problems without interference, a manifestation of willingness to enter into normal political and legal relationships, and an undertaking to settle differences by recourse to the normal processes of non-hostile international adjustment. It provides a kind of substitute, in brief, for the cement of effective political organization, making it less difficult to invoke legal processes in the absence of superior law-enforcing agencies or authorities. Until it is granted, legal processes cannot function normally.

Until recognition is granted, for example, there can be no assurance of diplomatic protection for the persons or property of nationals of either state who may travel, reside, or trade in the other. While trade and travel go on, they are continued at the individual's risk and without the support of such governmental aids as are usually available to facilitate the activities of nationals in foreign lands. The nationals of a state without recognized government may be admitted or excluded, like other aliens, but their deportation, when deportation becomes desirable, is seriously impeded. The mutual rendition of fugitives from criminal justice is, of course, suspended. Questions of governmental succession affecting a variety of public and private interests are either postponed or resolved with reference to an incomplete record of the essential facts. Since the foreign government has no access, directly or indirectly, to the national courts, matters which are normally settled by recourse to national tribunals remain unsettled. Instead of being facilitated, as it should be, this type of judicial settlement is obstructed.

The varied matters of international concern which would be adjusted normally through bilateral treaties are required to await the time when recognition will reopen the door to the processes of negotiation and agreement. Multilateral treaties may be concluded, with or without reservations as to recognition, but their provisions can be invoked only through the cumbersome device of an appeal or protest communicated through the government of a third state which has already granted recognition. Thus, in the recent Russian-Chinese crisis, the United States called the Soviet Government's attention to its obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war through the French Government as intermediary. In brief, the customary processes of international adjudication, arbitration, and negotiation are necessarily foreclosed until normal relationships have been restored.

The effect of this obstruction of normal international processes has been sufficiently demonstrated in Russian-American relations. For fourteen years the usual avenues have been closed. Difficult issues, the heritage of war and revolution, have remained unsettled and are certainly no nearer settlement today than they were a decade ago. Claims and counterclaims have remained unliquidated. The absence of normal relations has been a provocation rather than a check to propaganda. Instead of progress there has been stalemate. Instead of tolerance there has been hostility. It is beside the point to infer, from the experience of governments which have recognized the Government of Russia, that the United States would not have obtained a satisfactory settlement even if recognition had been granted. The point is that there would have been a possibility of settlement, that some progress, at least, could have been made in the adjustment of controversies.

When the United States finally concurs with other influential powers in recognizing the Government of Russia, a substantial and much needed contribution to international order and security will have been made. The act of recognition will imply neither approval nor disapproval of the system established under the Soviet regime. It will only acknowledge facts over which the United States has no control and for which it should assume no responsibility. It will mark the end of an unfortunate experiment in intervention and the resumption of normal relationships too long delayed.

For fourteen years the Soviet Government has been the *de facto* government of Russia. It is irrelevant that few in America admire its system or accept the economic theories upon which it is based. For fourteen years the Soviet Government has commanded the enthusiastic support of a militant minority of the Russian people and has compelled the acquiescence of the rest. It is irrelevant that this is in substance a form of dictatorship. For fourteen years the Soviet Government has represented Russia in the family of nations, conducting negotiations with a steadily expanding group of states, concluding treaties, and participating in conferences. It is irrelevant that its avowed understanding of important international obligations is different from the understanding of the United States.

In the eighteenth century, doctrines of monarchic legitimacy obstructed and thwarted the orderly processes of international intercourse. The United States led the way in repudiating and discrediting these doctrines and thereby made one of its distinctive contributions to an improved international system. In later years, notions of republican or constitutional legitimacy were also tried and were found utterly unsuited to an international society in which the delicate adjustment of a maximum of national freedom to the requirements of international order and stability is of supreme importance. It is matter of regret, for those who cherish American traditions, that the United States should have elected in these recent years to experiment with the vicious notion of capitalistic legitimacy. It is a disconcerting paradox, indeed, that the ghost of the Holy

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and Hitler, despite the fact that we are utterly opposed to many of the political ideals and practices of their respective systems. Gentlemen, these are partial statements and the lie that is half a truth is the hardest lie to combat. Recognitionists who press this argument are either uninformed or malicious. They suppress the vitally important fact that none of these foreign powers has set up in its capital city an organization for the purpose of overthrowing foreign governments; their leaders launch no invitation to nationals of other countries to wage civil war against the authorities of their respective lands; none of these powers has so flagrantly offended international friendship that its ministers and ambassadors have been expelled from numerous states whose patience and long suffering became exhausted. When Citizen Genet anticipated some of the forms of Soviet diplomacy in 1794 he was promptly withdrawn by the French Revolutionary Government on demand of Washington. And should Mr. Mussolini or Mr. Hitler conduct their international relations as Mr. Stalin does, I am confident they would meet the same reception here that Mr. Stalin's government has met for 15 years.—*Extracts, see 1, p. 256.*

by Philip Marshall Brown

Editor, American Journal
of International Law

WITH the advent of a new Administration in Washington the various arguments, disinterested or otherwise, in favor of the recognition of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have been revived. These arguments are too familiar to need repetition. They are generally prompted by generous liberal sentiments or by the exigencies of trade and diplomacy. They are rarely based on the rules and the precedents of international law. The purpose of this editorial is to present certain arguments based strictly on international law and precedents in order to show that recognition should not be accorded.

By recognition we mean the indication of willingness to accord to the government of another nation all of the rights and the amenities of normal intercourse between equal nations. The act of recognition is essentially a political one, seeking to define the conditions of intercourse between two sovereign peoples. Changes of government, ordinarily, and automatically, entail immediate and full recognition. The old custom of sending special diplomatic missions to recognize a new government, except in rare instances, such as the coronation of the King of Great Britain, has long ago fallen into disuse. Diplomatic courtesies are exchanged, and official relations go on as before without a break. When a *coup-d'état* occurs, such, for example, as the assassination of King Alexander of Serbia in 1903, other Powers may express their disapproval of the new regime by withdrawing the heads of their diplomatic missions. In such a case we may have a period of restricted diplomatic relations, which imply,

nevertheless, a *de facto* recognition. Such was the state of affairs in 1913 during the hapless regime of General Huerta in Mexico which failed to receive the *de jure* recognition of the United States Government.

The situation in Russia was quite different, where two violent changes in government were brought about within a short period of time. The Provisional Government under Kerensky was recognized immediately by the United States and by the other military allies. Upon the advent to power of the Bolsheviks the withdrawal of the diplomatic missions, and a virtual state of war between the Soviet regime and the United States, ensued. The recognition of the new regime in Russia presents, therefore, unusual complications. The Soviet Union may well claim that the resumption of full diplomatic relations with the United States involves also a kind of treaty of peace as well as the *de jure* recognition of a new government. They may have valid grounds for claims for damages occasioned by the American armies in Northern Russia.

In the meantime, the United States has had no official diplomatic relations with Russia for over fifteen years. That we have been compelled to acknowledge the *existence* of the *de facto* Government in Russia has been evidenced in various ways. We were co-signatories with the Soviet Government of the Kellogg Peace Pact. We have participated with representatives of that government in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Representatives of the Russian Government have been permitted to carry on unofficial diplomatic and consular functions in this country in order to facilitate the mutual interests of the Russian and the American peoples.

Why then is formal recognition withheld? The simplest answer is that the new government in Russia fails to satisfy the requirements of international law. As summarized by Mr. Hughes, when Secretary of State, "The fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations." The question of the origin and of the nature of the new government is of slight concern. The main issue is simply that indicated by Mr. Hughes, whether it is both able and willing to fulfill all of its international obligations.

On the first count, namely, the ability of the Russian Government to fulfill its obligations, it is essential to note that foreigners in Russia are entirely without any legal defense of their international rights. There exists no judicial organization or system of jurisprudence, such as exists in other nations, to guarantee to foreigners the simplest kind of legal protection. Under the constitutional principles of the new regime the right of private property is denied, and normal contracts between individuals have hardly any significance or value. The right of men to the enjoyment of the fruits of their labor and economies is so precarious as practically not to exist. Because religion in any form is deemed the enemy of socialistic philosophy and practices, the right of private worship and conscience is almost illusory. No formal assurances on the part of the Russian Government of respect for these

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Alliance should have been permitted to walk unchallenged in the country which contributed so much, but little more than a century ago, to thwart the Alliance's unholy ambitions.

During the century which preceded the World War it would have been difficult to find two governments whose antecedents, traditions, political ideals, and fundamental policies were more sharply opposed than the autocratic and militaristic government of Czarist Russia, on the one hand, and the democratic and pacific government of the United States on the other hand. There was cultivated, nevertheless, a tradition of friendship which proved advantageous to both countries. It may be that the tradition cannot be revived between governments fostering economies which are so sharply opposed; but tolerance, at least, may be cultivated as soon as normal relations are permitted to dissipate the ignorance, suspicion, and hostility now prevailing. The mere cultivation of tolerance between the United States and Russia will contribute much to the stabilization of international law and international relations at a time when stability and confidence are the world's most obvious needs.—*Extracts, see 4, p. 256.*

by Dr. Frederick L. Schuman, Ph. D.

University of Chicago

ACCORDING to Sir Henry Wotton's classical definition, a diplomat is an honest man sent abroad to lie for the good of his country. For the past fifteen years the American State Department in its handling of Russian matters has gone Sir Henry one better by keeping its diplomats at home, where they have been even more free than they would be abroad to indulge in all manner of misrepresentation, fantasy, and befuddled skulduggery. What benefit the country has derived from their antics it is difficult to discover. But for a decade and a half a little group of bureaucrats at Washington has stood stock still in firm resistance to all appeals for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R. Successive Presidents and Secretaries of State have followed their advice, and the American Government, with its head firmly buried in the sands of its own prejudices and stupidities, has remained unshaken in its determination to ignore completely the government of a nation of 160,000,000 people.

One of the most depressing aspects of the situation is that the question of American diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, like so many political issues in the United States, has almost never been discussed on its own merits. Thanks to the recognition policies of the Wilson Administration, adhered to with few qualifications by its Republican successors, the diplomatic recognition of one government by another has been given a meaning in the popular mind having no relation to its real significance.

Soviet recognition is opposed by the American Federation of Labor because Communists are sworn enemies of the type of labor unionism represented by that organization; by the D. A. R. and the American Legion because the "reds" are a menace to American institutions; by American manganese producers because the importation of cheaper and better Soviet manganese reduces their profits; by various ecclesiastical organizations because the Soviet regime is anti-religious; and by all right-thinking, 100 per cent Americans because the very existence of the U. S. S. R. is a challenge to their bourgeois complacency with private property and rugged individualism.

All these arguments and a dozen others on both sides are so far removed from the central question at issue that they have left the whole controversy in a state of almost hopeless muddle. This confusion is a result of a sadly mistaken effort on the part of the American Government to use the power to grant or withhold recognition as a weapon of diplomacy instead of using it, as it has been used in the past by the United States and as it is now used by most other governments, as a means of maintaining necessary political contacts with those in authority in foreign states. For years it was imagined that American non-recognition of the Soviet Government would in some miraculous way contribute to its downfall and that the United States, by withholding recognition, could achieve the same political results in a great country 5,000 miles away that it has at times been able to achieve in Mexico or Nicaragua. This entirely unworkable theory of diplomatic recognition has contributed to the popular idea that recognition is equivalent to moral approval.

Nothing could be farther removed from a sane view of the nature of diplomatic relations or from the traditional recognition policy of the United States itself. During most of the nineteenth century the United States adhered consistently to the de facto theory of recognition, first laid down by Jefferson in 1793, which holds that new governments in foreign states should be recognized as qualified to represent their states internationally as soon as they are in fact in effective control. This is the only conception of diplomatic recognition making possible normal relations between the states of the world. It is the conception all of the other great Powers have adhered to in extending diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government, which they like no better than do the officials in Washington. Any departure from this criterion necessarily produces an impossible situation in which each state undertakes to tell other states what kind of governments they must have and refuses to remain on speaking terms with states which fail to conform to the arbitrary specifications laid down.

The necessity of maintaining diplomatic contacts between states is so obvious that it would be pointless to speak of it except for the curious misapprehensions and distorted views to which the policy of the State Department has given rise. Only states at war or about to go to war sever diplomatic relations. States at peace must have means of communication with one another in an age in which every great question of world politics affects all states. In the absence of a Soviet Ambassador in Wash-

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primary rights under international law, therefore, would have the slightest value.

On the second count, namely, "the disposition to discharge international obligations," the record of its foreign relations reveals no intention on the part of the Russian Government to fulfill either the specific or the general obligations of the law of nations. The Soviet authorities, by a decree of January 21, 1918, declared "Unconditionally and without any exceptions, all foreign loans are annulled." This declaration has never been formally annulled. Whenever they have discussed these matters, they have done so for the evident purpose of diplomatic negotiations which have invariably proved fruitless, as Great Britain and France have discovered to their great discomfiture. The Soviet Government would seem to have implied so sweeping a repudiation of the acts of the government of the Tsars as to pretend, in effect, to have established an entirely new state, and not merely a new government. This is in itself a legal implication of far-reaching significance deserving special study.

But the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards international law as a whole is of the most profound significance. They have never abandoned their basic principle that the ultimate aim of Marxism is a world revolution to overthrow the capitalistic regime as an industrial, political and legal system. They are logically right in insisting that there is a fundamental antagonism between their system of state organization and that of the rest of the world. They are the sworn enemies of the existing system of international law which recognizes the right of private property, the sanctity of contracts, the right of personal liberty and of private conscience.

There is a preposterous kind of sardonic humor, therefore, in any demands for the recognition of the Soviet Government under the very system of law it aims to destroy! There is something amazing in the arguments of those who ignore the indisputable fact of the inability and the unwillingness of that government to fulfill all of its international obligations.

Why then, in the face of these legal and fundamental arguments, should there be a demand for recognition? First of all, because of a loose kind of liberalism which says that the people of every nation should have the right to work out their own problems in their own way. And so they have, provided they respect the rights of other people! Secondly, there is the materialistic argument that the trade relations between the two countries together with the financial and other interests would be greatly aided by recognition, particularly in this time of economic anarchy. As a matter of fact, without recognition, there has been considerable trade between Russia and the United States in recent years, with the exception of 1932. The Soviet Union was our principal customer in 1931 for agricultural equipment. It took 67% of all exports in agricultural machinery, and 28% of all exports of industrial machinery. Great Britain and France were greatly influenced by the economic argument for recognition, but their experience would indicate that they have not obtained the results expected.

While wishing the Russian peoples every good, the

United States, by standing on solid principles of international law, may be able to exert a powerful influence in behalf of the recognition by the Soviet Union of the basic rights and obligations of membership in the family of nations.—*Extracts, see 7, p. 256.*

by Marjorie Shuler

Special Correspondent
Christian Science Monitor

I am absolutely opposed to the present system of government in Russia because I believe that it's a denial of personal liberty, its domination of the acts, the words, even the thoughts of its citizens is the greatest wrong which any political system can do to any people.

Freedom has been the goal of mankind, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free use of the right to vote, free labor, freedom of religion. None of these measures of a free country exist in Russia today, and yet we are asked to look upon it as the most advanced form of government which the world has yet produced.

I left my yardstick behind me when I went into Russia last year. I count myself a liberal, and I went into Russia with all the interest and sympathy possible to see a new experiment of government. I came out with a feeling of distaste for the despotism which I saw in Russia, a deep pity for those who are compelled to live under that system, and a great hope that the people who have suffered so much will find a way to real liberty.

I contend that war has never solved human problems, and that to conduct yourself as though you were in a state of warfare only increases the problems under which you must live. I found the women of Russia believed they belonged to themselves, and that they will carry guns or do anything else which they wish to do. But after I have followed the women of the world as I have, from international convention to international convention, and have seen the women of the other countries with a belief that they owe a duty and responsibility to the world which is greater than self-ownership, I cannot help but hope that the ideals of the women of other countries will prevail rather than the ideals which the women of Russia are advancing today.

It is true great masses of Russian people are learning to read and to write, but will that mean intellectual power if they can read and write only what the government permits. Technically the people hold the land, but if a dictatorial control is to govern their tenancy and the conditions of their production, what stake have they in the development of the country? It is said there is employment for every Russian, but will that bring him happiness if he can take only the task which the government decrees he shall have, have only what the government permits him to earn, and then be unable to buy sufficient food and clothing, or get security for himself.

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ington and of an American Ambassador in Moscow, the governments of the two largest, wealthiest, and most populous white nations of the earth have no means of speaking to one another about anything. When the State Department is compelled by circumstances to communicate with the government of Russia, it is reduced to such shameful expedients as Secretary Stimson resorted to in December, 1929, when he asked a third government, with diplomatic representation at Moscow, to convey the advice of the American Government to the appropriate authorities. When Commissar Litvinov failed to understand how the United States could venture to give advice to a government which it refused to recognize, the Secretary of State was painfully surprised at such obtuseness.

Even the State Department and the White House are no longer disposed to argue that it is the function of the American Government to tell the people of Russia what kind of regime they may establish. For some years past they have contended that the Soviet Government, while in power in Russia without doubt and in a position to discharge its international obligations, is, in principle, unwilling to conduct itself properly. It is alleged that the Soviet Government is not the sort with which normal diplomatic relations can be maintained. Its peculiar viciousness is revealed by the alleged facts that it has repudiated the state debts of Russia to the United States and other countries, that it has confiscated the property of foreign investors, including Americans, and that it indulges in, or encourages, hostile propaganda against other states designed to foment revolution. These pernicious activities, it is argued, are violations of fundamental principles of international law, and no government which is so disrespectful of the rights of other states can be recognized. In the words of Calvin Coolidge:

"Our government does not propose to enter into relations with another regime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privileges of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose to make merchandise of any American principles. . . . Already encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But more are needed. . . . Whenever there appear works meet for repentance, our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia."—(Message to Congress, December 6, 1923.)

The State Department has apparently been waiting for works meet for repentance ever since. And our non-recognition policy has ever since been defended in terms which, to anyone familiar with the facts of the case, constitute the most fantastic nonsense ever uttered by one government regarding its relations with another. No honest student of international law or relations can concede validity to the allegations upon which these arguments are based. At no time have any of the innumerable investigating committees of snoopers, scare-mongers, and ultra-patriotic red-baiters adduced any evidence to support the charge that the Soviet Government has indulged in revolutionary propaganda here.

What is more absurd, the very government which hurls these charges of subversive activities against Moscow is the government which for a year and a half (1918-20) blockaded Soviet Russia, subsidized civil war against the Soviets, dispatched 6,000 troops to north Russia to fight the red army, maintained 10,000 troops in Siberia to keep open the route by which war supplies were shipped to Kolchak's white army, and endeavored by every means in its power to bring about the violent destruction of the very regime which it now accuses of its own sins. The Allied and American military intervention constituted a flagrant violation of international law and wrought incalculable damage to its victims. The Soviet Government has never repudiated any of its own obligations—a record which bourgeois governments may well envy—and it has repeatedly expressed its willingness to meet pre-revolutionary financial claims for repudiated debts and confiscated property if the Allied and American governments will only acknowledge their responsibility for making reparation to Russia for the injuries inflicted by their illegal intervention in Russian affairs. The interventionists have never been willing to make such acknowledgment. In 1923 Secretary of State Hughes blandly asserted that the United States "has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations." Despite this denial of responsibility, the Soviet Government is prepared to meet us more than halfway.

Apart from the considerations already suggested, even more cogent reasons of a political character can be advanced at the present time in favor of the abandonment of the policy of unintelligent mysticism to which Washington has hitherto adhered. These reasons are simple and clear. They can leave no doubt in the mind of any unprejudiced person that Soviet recognition would now constitute not only a consummation devoutly to be wished in terms of the general desirability of restoring contacts, but would also be an important constructive step in the direction of achieving certain concrete objectives which the United States is pursuing in 1932. The avowed major purposes of the United States in world affairs in the present year are to promote disarmament and to check Japanese imperialism in the Far East. These objectives can be attained only if effective means for their attainment can be devised. It is obvious that they cannot be achieved by the United States acting alone. It is equally obvious that none of the Powers of Western Europe is interested in collaborating actively with the United States in protecting China from Japanese aggression or in bringing about any substantial reduction of armaments. There is only one other Power which has a genuine interest in these purposes and that is the Soviet Union. Japanese control of Manchuria is even more distasteful to Moscow than it is to Washington. And disarmament is desired more earnestly by the U. S. S. R. than by the United States. Here is a community of interests and purposes which clearly calls for a type of diplomatic collaboration that the Soviet Government is only too willing to give. Whatever the final outcomes of the Disarmament Conference and the Far Eastern conflict may be, it is not open to question that

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I shall never forget the white-haired woman whom I saw kneeling in the streets of Leningrad, sweeping up with her hands the contents of a bag of white meal which she had spilled in the dirt. I shall never forget the women I saw in country villages, as well as in large cities, standing six and eight hours in front of a shop to buy food and then often be told there was no food to buy. I shall never forget seeing a thousand people stand all of one day before a shop in Moscow where it was rumored that shoes would be sold—at \$45 a pair. With these memories it is perhaps natural I should not be overly enthusiastic about that great modern experiment of kitchen factories, about which so many of the pro-Soviet speakers are talking. If it is possible for the government to deliver food in fixed quantities at regular hours and at moderate prices so that people can be served, twelve and fifteen thousand of them a day in those kitchen factories, then it would be possible for the government to deliver food under the same conditions to the food shops unless the government wished to remain in control of the food situation for some reason of its own.

Furthermore, when I look at the condition of mass eating, as I saw mass recreation and mass play, it does not seem to me that it represents a disinterested attitude for the development of Russia, but rather a means of retaining control of the Russian's thoughts and his words, even when he is at play. It is natural around a family table that children shall acquire something of the opinions of their parents. It is natural if you and I go out to amuse ourselves with a group of people whom we naturally choose that we develop a certain allegiance to our friends. But the Soviet government, with the radio bringing its party messages, with the party pamphlets and party workers active everywhere, uses mass eating and mass recreation and mass play as a means of breaking down every allegiance and every adherence save that of wholehearted service to communism.

To my sense of things the anti-religious movement is just another phase of this attempt to put communism first and alone. Religious adherence might interfere with allegiance to communism, so it was not sufficient to weaken the power of the Russian church. It was not sufficient to let the people go forth to find God as they might, to try to find some power of supreme good outside of human finite forms. No, it was necessary to make the people of Russia deny that there is a God.

My first contact with the anti-religious movement came in a Moscow school where I saw the pictures of sodden, wretched, degenerate human beings, whom the children had drawn after they had received their anti-religious instruction and had labeled these terrible creatures of their whimsy, God.

A few days later I met the manager of the Militant Society of Godless Man, and there are three phases of our conversation which I should like to pass on to you. The first was his emphasis upon the fact that his is a Militant Society of Godless Man, not a passive state of unbelief, you see, but an aggressive attempt to break down the faith of the world.

The second point was this. I asked him what ethical instruction is being substituted for religious training. He

said, "None. A good Communist needs no ethical teaching. Communism is his religion. He does what is right because he does it for his party and against capitalism."

The third point was this. I asked him, without reference to faith or creed, what was the attitude toward such ethical standards as those enunciated in the Sermon on the Mount. He replied, "We deny them. We do not believe in the brotherhood of man. With us the mass is everything; the individual nothing."

I ask you, what kind of a mass can you have unless it is made up of individuals, who are sound, intelligent and righteous.

But there is another substitute for religion which my friend, the manager of the Militant Society of Godless Man, did not mention. The Five-Year Plan is almost a Bible to some of the Russian people. I do not pretend to translate it, much less to interpret it. I only know I was asked to believe that industrial enterprises are being efficiently and honestly developed in the interior, while I walked over holes in the street and around piles of stone which had been dumped there apparently months before without any repairs being made. While I watched people hungry and cold because of the breakdown of the system of distribution of food and materials, and while in spite of all there is to be done in Russia, I saw thousands of people apparently idle on the streets day after day.

The late Czarina has been held up to the world as an example of the destructiveness of superstition. I saw that room which she left on her last long journey to a Siberian cellar. I saw the 800 icons which hang upon its walls with the upturned horseshoes, the sacred fish, the bowl of sand from Jerusalem. A strange, strange depth of superstition! Yet as I stood there I wondered how different it was from the kind of superstition that I had seen poured out with regard to the Five-Year Plan: to this idol of steel and iron which is being substituted for the religious faith of a people, this form of materialism, which in some mystic way is to feed and clothe these people.

I may be unfair to Russia and any speaker or any writer about Russia may be unfair as an individual, but at least our opinions have been arrived at as honestly and intelligently as we know how to reach them. But what the Russian thinks of the rest of the world is being dictated by his government. The cold and hungry man who is home from his employment on Wednesday, while his wife's day off may be Tuesday, and the children are at home from school on Monday, is told no matter how badly off he is, the worker in the United States is worse off. Through the radio, through the party speaker, through the government controlled newspapers, he is told about the employment riots and bread riots in New York City.

I talked with some soldiers from Odessa in the Ukraine. They had been told how severe is army discipline in America and how fortunate they should be because their officers were one with them on this trip. I went to a motion picture factory and saw half a dozen propaganda films in the process of being made. I went to a recreation park in Kiev, and heard the actors ridicule an American capitalist.

Continued on page 253

Schuman Cont'd

Russian-American cooperation would constitute a powerful force for peace and a means toward the attainment of the purposes which the United States is pursuing. Diplomatic recognition is an essential prerequisite to such cooperation. The longer it is withheld the less likely is the United States to achieve its purposes and the more discouraging and dangerous are the situations in Geneva and Manchuria likely to become. Under these circumstances a situation has been created in which, for the first time in a decade, intelligent self-interest dictates Soviet recognition as part of the international program of the United States. *Extracts, see 2, p. 256.*

by Louis Fischer

American Author, Moscow
Correspondent

THE Russian issue is very real today, and must be faced immediately. I do not hesitate to say that recognition already means more to the United States than to the Soviet Union. The kernel of the problems is China. The United States is a great Pacific Power. It has always endeavored to check Japanese expansion.

Today Japan is entrenched in Manchuria. Nothing short of war will dislodge her, not even a Soviet-American alliance. The only choice now left to Washington and Moscow is to arrange to cope with an expanded Japan.

Tokio wants two things from the Kremlin: the de jure recognition of Manchukuo, that is, the recognition as a *fait accompli* of the rape of Manchuria; and the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Although the railroad's value has depreciated by reason of floods, insurgent fighting, and the construction of a parallel Japanese system, it is still a precious property; its sale or surrender by the Russians, moreover, would be the most concrete proof of Moscow's reconciliation to Japanese mastery of Manchuria.

The Kremlin does not wish to recognize Manchukuo; it does not wish to yield the Chinese Eastern to the Japanese. De jure recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States may forestall both developments. But even if it fails to do that, even if a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact is signed, American recognition would rob such a pact of all but its formal significance, and Russia and America would join hands in the Pacific to watch over Japan. America needs Russia's aid in the Pacific.

The problem of Soviet-American trade is also involved. Trade is possible without recognition; but if diplomatic relations are of no use, why maintain them with other countries? In relation to the U. S. S. R., indeed, political ties are of special importance, for Soviet foreign trade is a state monopoly and it is the government which buys and

sells. The Soviet Government has never defaulted on a single commercial bill and its system of planned economy makes failure to pay most improbable. When the Russian authorities find that their resources are insufficient, they place fewer orders, and they have enough reserves to meet an unexpected emergency.

Russia still needs a great deal of machinery, and she has now decided in principle to import consumers' goods, which all capitalist countries have in abundance. These unsold goods depress markets and reduce prices. The Soviet Union could offer relief to many a harassed American manufacturer. It all depends on credits. Today most American banks boycott the Soviets. State Department rulings prevent banks from acting as agents for the Soviets. Recognition would facilitate commerce, for, all things being equal, the Russians prefer American quality.

The only reasons for non-recognition are American conservatism, American ignorance, American prejudice, and American folly. There are two problems that concern the United States: debts and propaganda. The Bolsheviks have borrowed nothing from America, yet Chicherin, the former Foreign Commissar, and Litvinov, the present incumbent, have stated publicly that the Soviet Government is ready to pay the Kerensky debts, though the money was spent, in large measure, for ammunition subsequently used against the Red Army and for other anti-Soviet purposes. That is the only Russian war debt owing to the United States government. Recognition would facilitate a settlement.

Propaganda is a more complicated question. Communist propaganda has been lied about a great deal. There is no circumstantial evidence of any organizational connection between the Third International and the Soviet Government. It is true that a historic relationship exists, but that relationship is not static. Things have changed since the Comintern first met in 1919. At that time, no Bolshevik conceived of the continued existence of the Soviet Government in Russia if other revolutions did not come to its aid in foreign lands. Moscow was weak. Revolutions seemed to be imminent in Europe and Asia. The sanguine Bolsheviks therefore emphasized the importance of world revolt. Much water has flowed down the Moscow River since then. The Soviet Union is strong and can stand alone. The Bolsheviks are now concentrated on the task of national upbuilding. I do not wish to imply that they reject the thesis of world revolution. They do not. But they will not harm Russia by working for it.

With respect, more immediately, to Communistic propaganda in the United States, the situation is much simpler. At the present juncture, communism in the United States is a minor movement which demagogues use as a bogey to frighten the stupid and attain their own ends. It should not be permitted to interfere with such a paramount issue as Russian recognition. In case of recognition, or in advance of recognition, the Soviet Government will pledge itself to non-interference in American domestic affairs, and will ask, in return, a similar pledge from Washington. —*Extracts, see 9, p. 256.*

Shuler *Cont'd*

I went to hear Mozart played in the Red Army Park in Moscow, and as the beautiful music came across the gardens, I looked up, and before me were four tall wooden figures, painted to represent the capitalist, the priest, the Fascist, the rich farmer: the reminders to the Russian people even there in the park of their duty to hate. It seems to me that that hatred for the outside world is being utilized as a weapon to distract their attention from what is wrong at home, and unify them against the outside world; and that they are learning that lesson of hatred is proven by the fact that on every few houses and every few shops in the big cities hang the shields bearing the scythe and hammer which indicate that the occupant of this house or shop has paid his bit toward the chemical warfare fund of Russia.

After I had seen these things I better understand the attitude of Russia's neighbors. When I was last in Norway seven years ago, I sat in the Parliament and saw a good sized block of Communist members in action. This year there is none. When I was in Sweden I was told it was a great pity I had to go to Russia; and in Finland, my friends said they would not cross the boundary line, no not for anything. Then I came out to Poland and saw that great standing army for which a quarter of the national budget is being expended. Communism is here as a challenge to capitalism, and no armies will keep it inside of Russia so long as there is a breakdown in the capitalist system which leaves any cold or hungry or despairing man to think that communism is the answer to his problem. The pity of it is that communism does not clothe nor feed nor give him happiness nor security, and that worse than all of these its system of control of the individual is such that at every point it is liable to misuse and to petty graft, to be used against the individual. I think the truest words I heard spoken in Russia were those of my friend, the manager of the Militant Society of Godless Man, "With us the mass is everything; the individual is nothing."—*Extracts, see 3, p. 256.*

by Bainbridge Colby

Former U. S. Secretary of State

THE original refusal of the United States to recognize Russia had nothing to do with the acknowledgment or repudiation of its debt to this country.

It had nothing to do with the type of government Russia saw fit to adopt, its communism, or other theories of economic and social relations.

It was not prompted by any desire to influence the internal administration of Russia, or to express an opinion, either favorable or adverse, upon her institutions. This was expressly disclaimed by the United States.

It was on an entirely different ground that American recognition was denied. Our refusal was predicated upon the fact that Russia was an enemy state.

Despite denial and the concealments and disguises employed by as subtle a propaganda as the world has ever seen, this enmity continues to be the foundation of Soviet foreign policy. Its government is organically linked with and controlled by the Communist Internationale, whose central purpose is the fomenting of revolution in every non-Bolshevist state.

If this is the fact—and no responsible Russian dares disaffirm it—the tests established for recognition under normal conditions have no application.

It is entirely beside the point that the Government of Russia may be, as the propagandists for recognition maintain, a de facto government, able to impose its authority and maintain order, although by cruel repression, within its territorial confines.

To concede recognition as a friend to a nation that protests she is not a friend, but on the contrary is dedicated to the overthrow of our institutions and sworn to conspire against our peace and security is unthinkable.

Let a revolutionary situation develop in any country, especially in a country of strategic importance in the economic and political system of the world, and the resources of the Russian State, already pledged to its support, will be immediately placed behind the revolutionary forces.

As recently as January 10, 1933, an Associated Press dispatch from Moscow, appearing in the New York Times, quoted Dictator Stalin as saying:

"Our own camp is being increased throughout the world by the successes of the 5-year plan. This means that proletarian revolutions are threatening the capitalist world and that these successes are mobilizing revolutionary forces of all countries against capitalism."

Credit is claimed by Moscow as the organizer and director of all movements of unrest in this country, such as the veterans' march on Washington, the disturbances among the Pennsylvania miners, the Scottsboro trial, and the agitation among our negro population against "white chauvinism," to use the expression current in Russia.

In a recent issue of Pravda, Stalin is quoted as having said:

"The Communist Internationale has created possibilities for the Communist Party in the United States to reach the stage where it is able to prepare the masses for the coming revolution."

Russia's present concentration upon her internal development and particularly the sacrifices which she is calling upon her oppressed people to endure, are explained by the desire to increase her power and make it more effective when this final—and from Russia's point of view inevitable—combat between capitalism and communism arrives.

In the light of known facts, it must be manifest to every unprejudiced mind that in all essential particulars the theory and practice of the Soviet regime remain precisely as they were when this country reached the decision that it could not recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained.—*Extracts, see 12, p. 256.*

A Glossary of Terms Used in This Issue

Bolshevist—A member of the left, or radical wing of the Socialist-Democrat party as opposed to Menshivist, a member of the right, or conservative wing.

Bourgeois—A man of middle rank in society; a citizen as between a gentleman on one hand and a peasant on the other; one of the shopkeeping class.—*Webster*.

Capitalism—Capitalism is the system in which the means of production are owned and controlled by a comparatively small section of the community and the mass of the people depend for their living upon working for wages; and in this system wages and prices and conditions generally are determined by competition, by legally unregulated bargaining between man and man.—*Somerville*.

What the thinkers of the left have in mind when they say "capitalism" is the predominant presence of the investing public, the creditor public, in the social organism. But they seem to think the investing public exists through some inherent malignity of its own; they do not realize that it is an inevitable and necessary part in the confused evolution of a world economic system. There is a continual production for profits and a continual withdrawal of a proportion of these profits from consumption to investments and the creation of further capital demanding further dividends.—*H. G. Wells*.

Communism—Communism may be defined as a type of social organization in which all wealth including both the producer's goods and consumers' goods, is owned and controlled by the community. It differs from socialism in that the latter proposes that the community shall own and operate only producers' goods, leaving the consumers' goods to be owned and enjoyed by individuals. A completely communistic society, for example, would own the dwelling houses and even the food and clothing, but would distribute these to individual members very much as they are now distributed within the small group which we call the family.—*Thos. N. Carver*.

Democracy—Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people and exercised either directly or indirectly through a system of representation and delegated authority periodically renewed, as in a constitutional representative government, or republic.—*Webster*.

E.C.C.I.—Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Fascism—The theory of Fascism is essentially in conflict with the historical materialism of Marx, which conceives of history as a predetermined class struggle inevitably resulting in the collapse of capitalism. According to fascism, political and economic factors are mobile, and subject to change in different historical environments. Also, society is profoundly influenced by such spiritual factors as culture, religion, custom and tradition, and strives to preserve them for future generations.

Unlike Marxism, fascism holds out no promise of a millenium. It offers, however, the prospect of an ordered and disciplined existence within the framework of the state. The fascist state is conceived not as an aggregate of groups and individuals, but as a spiritual entity which survives and transcends successive generations. The individual, according to fascism, is subordinated to society, but not eliminated. He remains an element of society "however transient and insignificant he may be." The individual, however, cannot lead an existence distinct from that of the state. He owes a duty to the state, and in exercise of this duty may be called on to sacrifice everything, including life. The preeminence of duty is regarded as the highest ethical value of fascism. The fascist state is not merely an administrative organization, concerned with political or economic issues; it is "totalitarian," embraces all interests and activities, whether of groups or individuals, and permeates the spiritual content of life. Nothing can exist outside or above the state. "One cannot be fascist in politics . . . and non-fascist in school, non-fascist in the family circle, non-fascist in the workshop."—*Vera Micheles Dean*.

Imperialism—

1. The power or government of an emperor; imperial authority or system.

2. The policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking, or acquiescing in, the extension of the control, dominion, or empire of a nation, as: a. By the acquirement of new territory or dependencies, *esp.* when lying outside the nation's natural boundaries, or by the extension of its rule over other races of mankind, as where commerce demands the protection of the flag. b. By the closer union of more or less independent parts for operations of war, copyright, internal commerce, etc., as in the case of the closer union of the parts of the British Empire advocated by some.—*Webster*.

Kremlin—The citadel of a town or city; especially (when capitalized), the citadel of Moscow, a large inclosure which contains imperial palaces, cathedrals, churches, an arsenal, etc.—*Webster*. *Note*: Commonly referred to as the seat of Government in Russia).

Menshevist—See Bolshevik.

O.G.P.U.—The Russian police service, comprising regular uniformed police as well as the secret service. Formerly called the Cheka.

Proletarian—One of the poorest and lowest class in a community or state; one with no property and only the meanest or most irregular employment.—*Webster*.

Socialism—A political and economic theory of social reorganization, the essential feature of which is governmental control of economic activities, to the end that competition shall give way to cooperation and that opportunities of life and the reward of labor shall be equitably apportioned.—*Webster*.

The Students' Question Box

Replies to Queries on Constitutional Amendments

Q. What is the legal provision for repealing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

A. The same as for amending. Article V. of the Constitution reads:

"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."

The Pending Prohibition Repeal Amendment specifically provides for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.

Q. How soon after the Repeal Amendment is ratified by the thirty-sixth state will it go into effect?

A. Immediately. This point is covered by an Act of Congress. Section 160, title 5, of the United State Code, which reads as follows:

"Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States."

In a recent statement on the subject, the Department of State said:

"The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution is not consummated on the date when the Secretary of

State issues his certificate, but on the date when the requisite three-fourths of the legislatures of the States have ratified the resolution proposing the amendment in question."

Q. How many proposed Amendments to the Constitution are now before the States for ratification?

A. Two: The Child Labor Amendment, the resolution for which was passed by Congress December 3, 1923, and the Prohibition Repeal Amendment, the resolution for which was passed by Congress on February 20, 1933.

No time limit was set for the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment. The record on which stands, for ratification, 15 States; for rejection, 24 States. Two States, New Hampshire and North Dakota, first rejected the amendment and then rescinded their rejections and ratified. The fact that there is no time limit leaves the fight for ratification open indefinitely.

A time limit of seven years for ratification was provided in the resolution for the Repeal Amendment. On September 19 the record on the Repeal Amendment stood: 31 States had ratified and none had rejected.

In October Virginia and Florida will vote on ratification. On November 7, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and Kentucky will vote.

In most States the proposal voted on is for the calling of a convention to vote on ratification. As the proposals are for the conventions to meet in December. Under the schedule for conventions, December 5 is the earliest date on which the Repeal Amendment can be actually ratified.

Q. What will be the number of the Prohibition Repeal Amendment?

A. Which ever of the two pending amendments, Prohibition Repeal and Child Labor, is passed first will become the Twenty-first Amendment, the next becoming the Twenty-second Amendment. The Eighteenth Amendment will remain in the published list of Amendments with the notation that it was repealed by the Repeal Amendment, which will be either the Twenty-first or the Twenty-second Amendment.

A Review of U. S. Relations With Soviet Russia, 1917-1928

Continued from page 232

government. The present rulers of Russia, while seeking to direct the evolution of Russia along political, economic and social lines in such manner as to make it an effective 'base of the world revolution,' continue to carry on, through the Communist International and other organizations with headquarters at Moscow, within the borders of other nations, including the United States, extensive and carefully planned operations for the purpose of ultimately bringing about the overthrow of the existing order in such nations.

"As concerns commercial relations between the United States and Russia, it is the policy of the Government of the United States to place no obstacles in the way of the development of

trade and commerce between the two countries, it being understood that individuals and corporations availing themselves of the opportunity to engage in such trade, do so upon their own responsibility and at their own risk. The American Government does not object to banking arrangements necessary to finance contracts for the sale of American goods on long term credits, provided the financing does not involve the sale of securities to the public. The American Government, however, views with disfavor the flotation of a loan in the United States or the employment of American credit for the purpose of making an advance to a régime which has repudiated the obligations of Russia to the United States and its citizens and confiscated the property of American citizens in Russia."

Status of Recognition of Soviet Russia by Other Nations

- 1—Germany on March 3, 1918 by Treaty. Diplomatic relations reestablished on April 16, 1922 by Treaty.
- 2—Austria on March 3, 1918 by Treaty. Reestablishment of diplomatic relations on February 25, 1924 by Note.
- 3—Turkey on March 3, 1918 by Treaty. Reestablishment of relations on March 16, 1921 by Treaty.
- 4—Estonia on February 2, 1920 by Treaty.
- 5—Lithuania on July 12, 1920 by Treaty.
- 6—Latvia on August 11, 1920 by Treaty.
- 7—Finland on October 14, 1920 by Treaty.
- 8—Persia on February 26, 1921 by Treaty.
- 9—Afghanistan on February 28, 1921 by Treaty.
- 10—Poland on March 18, 1921 by Treaty.
- 11—Great Britain on March 16, 1921 (Trade Agreement). On February 1, 1924 by Note. Diplomatic relations broken off May 26, 1927. Resumed December 20, 1929. On July 3, 1922 Trade Agreement extended to Canada. On March 24, 1924 by letter to Yazikov.
- 12—Italy on December 26, 1921 (Trade Agreement). On February 7, 1924 by Note and Treaty.
- 13—Norway on September 2, 1921 (Trade Agreement). On February 15, 1924 by Note.
- 14—Greece on March 8, 1924 by Note.
- 15—Sweden on March 15, 1924 by Note.
- 16—China on May 31, 1924 by Treaty. Diplomatic relations broken off December 14, 1927. Resumed December 12, 1932.
- 17—Denmark on April 23, 1923 (Trade Agreement). On June 18, 1924 by Note.
- 18—Mexico on August 4, 1924 by Memorandum. Diplomatic relations broken off January 23, 1930.
- 19—France on October 28, 1924 by Telegram.
- 20—Czechoslovakia on June 5, 1922 (Trade Agreement).
- 21—Arabian Saudian Kingdom on March 30, 1924 by Exchange of Notes.
- 22—Japan on January 20, 1925 by Convention.
- 23—Iceland on June 22, 1926 by Note. (Through Danish Legation at Moscow).
- 24—Uruguay on August 23, 1926 by Note.
- 25—Yemen on November 1, 1928 by Treaty.
- 26—Spain on July 28, 1933 by Telegram.

Sources of Information for this Number

- 1—Speech at Washington Auditorium, April 18, 1933, at Mass Meeting opposing Recognition of Russia, held under auspices of American Legion.
- 2—The Nation, May 18, 1932.
- 3—Speech at Foreign Policy Association Luncheon, New York City, January 31, 1931.
- 4—Michigan Law Review, December 1931.
- 5—New York Herald Tribune, December 15, 1932.
- 6—Congressional Record, April 12, 1933.
- 7—American Journal of International Law, April, 1933.
- 8—Washington Herald, September 17, 1933.
- 9—The Nation, December 28, 1932.
- 10—Congressional Record, April 22, 1933.
- 11—New Outlook, April, 1933.
- 12—Letter to Louis A. Johnson, Commander American Legion, April 15, 1933.

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